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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
 Modern Japanese nationalism, from the late-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
century, seems distinctively non-egalitarian compared to the western counterparts. Unlike 
civic nationalism, Japanese nationalism has promoted inequality both domestically and 
internationally. The Japanese constitution from 1889 to 1947 limited the public’s 
participation in the political system. Japan’s nationalistic foreign policies induced a series 
of wars, through which Japan challenged colonial powers and tried to establish its own 
hegemony over neighboring states. 
 Japanese nationalism was a product of the nineteenth century confrontation with 
the west, but was not a simple replication of the western concept of nation. The strong 
impression of Japanese nationalism and its radical version of imperialistic militarism 
seemed a resonance of European influences.1 Matsumoto Sannosuke, nevertheless, 
contrasts Japanese nationalism to western nationalism as theorized by Hans Kohn. Kohn 
describes western nationalism as “qualitatively akin to the love of humanity or of the 
whole earth” and nurtured by the European Christian identity.2 Japanese nationalism, as 
Matsumoto argues however, was formed through contact with the international world 
operated by the western states, and Japanese nationalism rigidly distinguished Japan from 
such international society. Japanese nationalism thus did not share western nationalism’s 
universalism and egalitarianism across nation-states.3 This characteristic explains 
                                               
1 See: Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Fascism outside Europe: The European Impulse against Domestic Conditions 
in the Diffusion of Global Fascism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 
2 Matsumoto Sannosuke, “The Significance of Nationalism in Modern Japanese Thought: Some Theoretical 
Problems,” The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 31, No. 1 (Nov., 1971), 51. 
3 Matsumoto, 51. 
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Japanese nationalism’s non-egalitarian characteristics. Matsumoto further indicates that 
Japanese nationalism involves the pattern of political integration in Japan. While western 
nationalism was characterized by its commitment to democratic consent and respect of 
free and independent individuals, Japan’s political integration emphasized collective 
interest rather than individual liberty.4 Therefore, the Japanese state in the nineteenth 
century counted on broad emotional appeal to the national consciousness of a shared 
identity despite individual’s liberty. The distinctive features of collective national identity 
and shared obedience towards the Japanese Emperor’s imperial sovereignty served as the 
pivots of Japanese nationalism.5  The final characterization of Japanese nationalism that 
Matsumoto raises is the unique idea of Japan’s national mission. Japanese nationalism, as 
not symbolized by an individualistic affection for humanity, did not carry the principles 
of “liberty,” “equality,” and “fraternity” but bore the continuous aim of preserving 
kokutai, the emperor-centric national polity.6 Japanese nationalism had been serving the 
purposes of self-perpetuation and self-expansion of a Japanese nation-state, instead of 
exercising universal values according to the principle of humanity. Japanese nationalism 
thus is an indigenous reaction encouraged by earlier sentiments of national identity and 
awareness of obligatory affiliation in society. 
 This thesis argues that an intellectual paradigm of proto-nationalistic ideologies 
since the seventeenth century made modern Japanese nationalism distinctive. Proto-
nationalism in pre-modern Japan, as I define it, was an ideological framework of 
Japanese identity and cultural uniqueness held by aristocratic intellectuals in seventeenth- 
                                               
4 Matsumoto, 52. 
5 Matsumoto, 52. 
6 Matsumoto, 53. 
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to nineteenth-century Japan. Proto-nationalist intellectuals, in their writings and 
correspondences, addressed their awareness of the Japanese state’s political structure and 
involvement in foreign affairs. These intellectuals with political consciousness and 
pragmatic deliberation offered policy recommendations that accorded with their 
contemporary Japan’s political and socio-cultural circumstances. Pre-modern Japan’s 
proto-nationalism, therefore, indicated a coherent identity of the Japanese state. 
 Confucianism, introduced from China and further reinterpreted and debated in 
Japan, facilitated the development of Japan’s pre-modern proto-nationalistic ideologies. 
The architects of Japanese proto-nationalism were at first Confucian scholars and later 
their critics, since Confucian theory and rhetoric could serve as either affirmative or 
contrapuntal references. Confucianism’s facilitation of proto-nationalism took effect 
through various patterns, as Confucianism was a multifunction and multilayered 
intellectual system. Kiri Paramore’s research on Japanese Confucianism inspires my 
methodology of investigating Japan’s proto-nationalistic ideologies. Paramore notes that 
Confucianism in Japan carried many utilities across intellectual disciplines. Confucianism 
offered philosophical moral principles; it outlined a stable governance as a paradigm of 
political science; it indoctrinated research methods of philology and instructed verbal 
eloquence; and it reinforced the importance of religious piety.7 Japanese proto-
nationalism shaped by Confucian scholars and their critics, therefore, had influenced 
disciplines of moral philosophy, public affairs, education, and religion in pre-modern 
Japan as well.  
                                               
7 Kiri Paramore, Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 3-4. 
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 Japanese Confucianism, with Chinese intellectual origins, consistently evolved on 
both the Chinese mainland and the Japanese islands. Confucius, the paradigm’s name 
sake, established Confucianism as a school of morality in the public sphere. He witnessed 
the last moment of China’s Spring-and-Autumn period in the fifth century B.C.E, when 
unsettling feudal states rivaled each other without consideration of political morality.8 
Confucius expressed his nostalgia for the political stability and social harmony in the era 
of “early sage kings” and their feudal state, dating from as early as China in the twenty-
fourth century B.C.E.9 Their righteous governance prospered until the beginning of the 
Zhou Dynasty, and started to decline after the reign of King Wen, King Wu, and the 
Duke of Zhou in the eleventh century B.C.E.  Diminishing moral awareness and 
emerging rivalry between feudal states at that time symbolized the gradual degradation of 
stability.10 With the desire to revive justified rule of “early sage kings,” Confucius 
practiced philology and designated the “Six Classics” as references for political 
principles and ritual practices.11 Confucianism’ virtues of humanness, righteousness, and 
propriety, etc. were established upon Confucius’ retrospection of ancient documents, 
which accorded with the sage kings’ advocacy and examples.  
Confucianism’s ideal domestic and international worlds were always hierarchical. 
The Confucian social hierarchy was stratified based on one’s literacy in Confucian 
knowledge and moral virtue.12 A dichotomy between hua, civilized regimes, and yi, 
uncivilized or barbarian communities characterized Confucian international society.13 
                                               
8 Daniel K. Gardner, Confucian a Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 14. 
9 Gardner, Confucian a Very Short Introduction, 13. 
10 Gardner, Confucian a Very Short Introduction, 14. 
11 Gardner, Confucian a Very Short Introduction, 25. 
12 Xinzhong Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 46. 
13 Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism, 48. 
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Confucianism, as a political philosophy, evaluated the level of civilization based on the 
implementation of Confucian doctrine. Hua, which originally meant the Chinese regime, 
held comparative superiority in physical and intellectual assets. The civilized regime, 
therefore, deserved the respect and obedience from barbarian communities for its 
accomplishments according to Confucian standards. 
 Confucianism was a product in ancient feudal China but was utilized by classical 
China’s centralized regimes as political philosophy and individual moral principles. The 
Chinese Han dynasty institutionalized Confucianism as the official political doctrine 
since the third century B.C.E., because Confucianism emphasized social stability and 
harmony.14 China’s centralized bureaucracy employed literate Confucian scholars to 
handle administrative tasks, considering their capability in examining documents and 
discoursing arguments. The Han-dynasty leadership decreed to establish official 
institution of Confucian education, which were funded by the state to indoctrinate 
Confucian scholars and recruit junior-level civil servants.15 The official investment in 
Confucianism continued not only as an administrative convention, but also as an 
educational means. The seventh-century Tang-Dynasty Confucian scholar-bureaucrats 
further elaborated and consolidated Confucianism as a paradigm of political 
philosophy.16 This classical version of Confucianism arrived in Japan before the sixth 
century via Korea as the intermediary, when Japanese diplomatic mission returned from 
the Tang dynasty.17 Returning Japanese delegations introduced the Confucian 
bureaucratic and educational system, imitating Tang China’s lawful governance and 
                                               
14 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 20-21. 
15 Gardner, Confucian a Very Short Introduction, 27. 
16 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 6-7. 
17 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 6-7. 
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efficient administration. This helped Japan’s state-building, because Japan was as 
feudally divided as ancient China by the sixth century, when Confucian institutions were 
introduced and established.18  
Chinese Confucianism merged with Buddhism and Taoism and evolved into what 
had been referred as Neo-Confucianism in the eleventh-century. Neo-Confucianism 
prospered in Medieval-Chinese Song dynasty.19 Introduction of Neo-Confucianism to 
Japan occurred around the sixteenth century, as this branch of Confucianism’s 
interpretation arrived from the Chinese Ming-Dynasty.20 The Ming dynasty had driven 
the Mongols out of mainland China, and reactivated Sino-Japanese civilian trade relations 
and intellectual exchange, which had been closed due to hostility between the Mongols 
and Japanese.21 Neo-Confucianism denounced the fundamentalist approach of earlier 
Confucian sects, which Neo-Confucians regarded as inhumane and dogmatic.22 
 While China had been mostly centralized from its ancient to pre-modern era, 
feudalism had been the fundamental political characteristic of Japanese political history 
from the twelfth to the nineteenth century. Pre-modern Japan’s domestic politics were 
similar to that of the era of Confucius, wherein the central authority of Bakufu and 
regional autonomous factions coexisted. The Bakufu, or Shogunate, literally meant the 
headquarters of Sei-i Taishogun (“barbarian-quelling generalissimo”), abbreviated as the 
Shogun. The title of Shogun and the institution of Bakufu originated in the late-twelfth 
century, when Minamoto no Yoritomo founded the Kamakura Bakufu as Japan’s first 
                                               
18 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 44. 
19 Gardner, Confucian a Very Short Introduction, 68. 
20 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 18. 
21 John Dardess, Ming China, 1368-1644: a Concise History of a Resilient Empire (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2012), 23. 
22 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 44. 
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feudal military government.23 Though the Japanese Emperor, Tennō, was the country’s 
titular leader, the Shogun, with his title appointed by the Emperor, obtained agency to 
exercise the country’s central political authority on behalf of the Emperor.24 The Bakufu 
was usually referred by the location of its central administration, for instance, the cities of 
Kamakura (1185-1333 C.E.), Ashikaga (1336-1573 C.E.), and Edo (1603-1867 C.E.). 
The Tokugawa Bakufu, also known by its residence in Edo, was also known by the name 
of the Shogun’s clan. These Bakufus throughout Japan’s pre-modern history, with their 
centralized political authority, coexisted with local samurai war bands. For the Tokugawa 
bakufu, daimyos, regional warlords, held privileges of political and economic autonomy, 
while the Bakufu had the responsibility to maintain social stability and mediate conflict 
between belligerent daimyos.25 Some Shoguns assured peace with overwhelming and 
deterring military strength, while others utilized political manipulation and maintained a 
balance of power. The Japanese age of warring states, or Sengoku, between the mid-
fifteenth and early-seventeenth centuries witnessed constant conflicts between daimyos, 
regional warlords, after the Ashikaga Bakufu’s central institution collapsed and lost its 
peace-keeping ability.26 Sengoku, shared the same name and political circumstances with 
Confucius’ era of political disintegration and feudal chaos. And for that reason, 
Confucianism seemed a good fit for Japan’s circumstances. Military conquerors, like Oda 
Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, defeated rivals and established alliances with 
coercion and bribery, and ultimately put an end to the warring states period.27 Tokugawa 
                                               
23 Jeffery Mass, Yoritomo and the Founding of the First Bakufu: the Origins of Dual Government in Japan 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1999), 1-5. 
24 Mass, Yoritomo and the Founding of the First Bakufu, 1-5. 
25 Kenneth Grossberg, Japan’s Renaissance: the Politics of the Muromachi Bakufu (Cambridge, MA: 
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1981), 5-8. 
26 Grossberg, Japan’s Renaissance, 5-8. 
27 Conrad Totman, Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 3. 
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Ieyasu, Tokugawa regime’s founder, following the achievement of predecessors, founded 
his Bakufu at Edo in the early-seventeenth century, and his son and grandson, Hidetada 
and Iemitsu, held Japan’s central political authority throughout the first half of the 
seventeenth century. The Tokugawa Bakufu, however, only exercised limited power 
because of seventeenth-century Japan’s political fragmentation. 
Confucianism shaped an intellectual hierarchy between pre-modern Japan and 
China based on their levels of civilization. John Fairbanks defines the China-established 
and –led international network in East Asia as the Imperial Chinese Tributary System. 
Asian countries including Japan, Korea, Ryukyu, and Vietnam, nominally as China’s 
tributary states, maintained extensive trade but loose diplomatic relations with China in 
the Tributary System.28 The Confucian notion of hua-yi dichotomy was the tributary 
system’s cornerstone, since the gap in the level of civilization justified neighboring 
states’ submission to China’s prosperity. China, being the most advanced civilization, had 
the responsibility to civilize its less enlightened tributary states with generous endowment 
of merchandise and intellectual achievement. The tributary system and its “loose set of 
expectations and precedents” was systematically institutionalized in the fourteenth-
century Ming dynasty.29 While commodities and capital circulated in this network, 
ideologies and information from China proliferated to neighboring nations as well. While 
Japan had not always been a participant in the tributary system, Japanese Confucian 
scholars still understood China as hua, a civilized regime. 
                                               
28 John King Fairbank, The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 1-4. 
29 Fairbank, The Chinese World Order, 50-54. 
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One vital political incident in China nurtured the Japanese pre-modern proto-
nationalistic ideologies in the seventeenth century. China’s Ming dynasty ran into its 
destiny of breakdown under domestic insurrection and foreign threat. The Ming was 
China’s last monarchical dynasty governed by an ethnically Han-Chinese royalty, and 
lasted from 1368 to 1644. At its end, people were suffering from starvation and 
bureaucratic exploitation because of a severe climate and institutional corruption. 
Chinese peasants rose up against the regime.30 Manchus residing north of China founded 
a dynasty they named the Qing under the leadership of the Aisin Gioro family in 1636; 
and this was an imitation of Han-Chinese’s political institutions.31  Manchus in 
northeastern China had been ideologically perceived as nomadic barbarians according to 
Confucianism’s hua-yi dichotomy, but were invited by the Ming regime to enter Ming’s 
territory and assist the suppression of domestic resurrections.32  Manchus did not leave 
mainland China after they expelled the rebels from the Ming capital of Beijing. Rather, 
they occupied Beijing and expanded the formal governance of Qing to China proper in 
1644. The Manchu-governed Qing dynasty gradually conquered all territories under the 
administration of the Ming Dynasty, and unified China after eliminating the Ming rump 
state by the end of the seventeenth century.33 Thus, the Manchu-led Qing Dynasty from 
the “uncivilized” northeast substituted the Ming which had been led by Han-Chinese 
sovereigns. 
                                               
30 John Dardess, Ming China, 1368-1644, 89. 
31 William Rowe, China’s Last Empire: the Great Qing (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 20-24. 
32 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 25-27. 
33 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 35-36. 
12 
 
The Tokugawa Bakufu, along with its Confucian advisors and bureaucrats, 
perceived the seventeenth-century dynastic transition in China as not merely an ordinary 
regime change, but a disgraceful nomadic destruction of the most advanced civilization 
and the home of Confucianism. Subsequently, Tokugawa-Japan discarded the mainland 
as its long-standing model of economic development, political institutions, and 
educational models.34 It is noteworthy that Japan had been consistently and unilaterally 
acquiring intellectual and commercial products through the Chinese tributary network 
since the sixth century. But Japan disdained the Manchu regime’s legitimacy because of 
the Confucian perception of the Manchus as inferior barbarians.35 Though resenting the 
Manchu’s savagery, Confucian scholars in seventeen-century Japan responded in 
different ways to the regime change on the continent and reshuffling of the international 
system. The Hayashi clan were the hereditary Neo-Confucian advisors of the Tokugawa 
Bakufu administration, instructing both domestic and foreign affairs.36 They mourned the 
fall of Ming Dynasty, and sincerely wished for the restoration of the original tributary 
system from which Japan benefited both monetarily and intellectually. They saw the 
Manchu conquest as a reversal of the hua-yi polarity between the civilized and barbarian 
societies. From the perspective of the iconoclastic Yamaga Sokô, a classical Confucian 
scholar who did not affiliate himself with the Bakufu, Ming China’s downfall was an 
opportunity for Japan to establish an alternative East-Asian international system that 
substituted of the Sinocentric tributary order. He thus made the case for Japan’s inherent 
superiority. 
                                               
34 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 24. 
35 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 24. 
36 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 42-43. 
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 Confucianism was the pivot of Japanese proto-nationalism’s birth and subsequent 
evolution. Affection for Confucianism distinguished this stage of proto-nationalism’s 
development. Japanese scholars, from both the Hayashi family’s Neo-Confucian/shushi-
gaku and Yamaga Sokô’s classical Confucian/kogaku camps, consulted Confucian 
classics as a moral guide when creating the notion of proto-nationalism as their response 
towards diplomatic incidents around Japan. In the eighteenth-century, Japanese 
Confucian intellectuals indigenized Confucianism as a political science to modify Japan’s 
domestic government structure; they encouraged the political perfection of society 
towards peace and prosperity. Though these scholars, foremost the renowned Ogyû Sorai, 
did not address Japanese identity directly, their scholarship set the stage for later proto-
nationalist imaginings. The kokugaku (“national learning school”) and mitogaku (“Mito 
school”) critics of Confucianism utilized Confucianism’s intellectual legacy of proto-
nationalism, but turned against Confucianism itself by attacking Japanese society’s 
reliance on ideologies and items with Chinese origins, and embraced Japan’s domestic 
intellectual achievements. The next stage of pre-modern Japanese proto-nationalism was 
therefore constituted upon the criticism of Confucianism’s Chinese nature. The late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century kokugaku and mitogaku scholars ironically 
inherited the methodology of Confucian philology when searching for references in 
Japanese classics to substantiate their anti-Confucian arguments. Japan-centric scholars 
fiercely attacked Ogyû Sorai’s favor for Confucianism as a Chinese intellectual 
paradigm. The Confucian emphasis on religious piety was revitalized by the kokugaku 
intellectuals, but to serve the Japanese indigenous belief of Shintoism. Confucianism in 
14 
 
Japan, through the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, constituted and facilitated the 
progress of proto-nationalism with its both affirmative and contrapuntal functions.  
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Chapter II: Tokugawa-Japanese Confucianism in International Relations 
 
When Tokugawa Japan witnessed the continental emergency and barbarians’ 
triumph in the East Asian area, the Japanese state’s collective identity and sovereignty 
inevitably came into the consideration of its Confucian scholars. These were men who 
served in the Tokugawa administration or were concerned with Japan’s security. Their 
Confucianism expressed intellectual responses to the dynastic transition in China and 
fluctuation in contemporaneous international relations; they thus contributed to a form of 
proto-nationalism in pre-modern Japan. 
 
Confucianism in early-Edo Japan  
The seventeenth-century Japanese Confucianism was divided into shushigaku 
(“Zhu Xi-school” Neo-Confucianism from eleventh-century Song-China) and kogaku 
(classical Confucianism from sixth-century Tang-China). The Tokugawa Bakufu 
embraced Neo-Confucianism as the state’s official ideology in administration and 
education. The intellectual authority of the Hayashi clan symbolized the official 
sponsorship and orthodoxy of Neo-Confucianism in early-Edo Japan; while Yamaga 
Sokô and other kogaku scholars denounced Neo-Confucianism as heresy and encouraged 
the reinvigoration of more classical Confucian ideologies. Neo-Confucianism was 
heavily influenced by the Buddhist ideology of self-perfection and the methodology of 
introspection, but without the Buddhist belief of an external heaven apart from the earthly 
world. On the other hand, kogaku’s traditional Confucianism concentrated on the macro-
scale rectification of society. Both shushi-gaku and gogaku, nevertheless, acknowledged 
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the necessity of hierarchical obedience and social stratification, in order to achieve an 
orderly world. These were consistent features of Confucian scholarship since its 
inception. 
Edo Japan was a pseudo-unified, pre-modern feudal state, which the Tokugawa 
Bakufu centrally administered. Daimyos, military clans across country, nominally 
submitted to the Tokugawa with annual tribute missions but enjoyed local administrative 
autonomy. Consolidating political centralization after the Tokugawa family’s unification 
of Japan required ideological justification by Confucian doctrines. The Confucian 
ideology of hierarchical obedience consolidated the Tokugawa Shogun’s authoritative 
governance. Though local military clans remained autonomous, these Edo-Japanese 
daimyos submitted to the national authority of the Tokugawa Shogun, who mediated 
conflicts among clans and coordinated nationwide administrative policies and military 
operations.37 Further, the Tokugawa Bakufu utilized the Confucian doctrines of loyalty 
and piety to downplay the Shogun’s arrogation of political authority from the Emperor.38 
The Tokugawa Shogun justified his political dominance by proclaiming loyalty to the 
Emperor, who was nominally country’s supreme ruler and religious leader of Shinto. 
According to the logic of political hierarchy, loyalty to the Shogun could also be 
considered loyalty to the Emperor. 
Confucian education offered the Japanese aristocracy and samurai society both 
intellectual and moral prestige over commoners. Edo Japanese used Japanese as their 
vernacular language but employed Chinese writing in their intellectual sphere, a cultural 
tradition since the sixth century when Confucianism first arrived to Japan. Since the 
                                               
37 Mass, Yoritomo and the Founding of the First Bakufu, 1-5. 
38 Totman, Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 41-43. 
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Tokugawa Bakufu promoted Confucianism as the official political doctrine and kept 
using Chinese as the administrative working language, intellectual literacy in Edo Japan 
was distinguished by the capability of comprehending Chinese language. Further, as Edo-
Japanese Neo-Confucian indoctrination symbolized individual’s ethical morality, 
Confucian education elevated Tokugawa-Japanese aristocrats, samurais and certain 
merchant-class individuals, who could afford to attend Confucian institutions, above 
much less affluent commoners based on virtue.39 Japanese Confucian scholars with 
intellectual advancement were recruited to the Bakufu to engage in state administration 
and public education. The access to political careers offered Tokugawa-era Japanese 
Confucian scholars the opportunity to shape the identity of the Japanese state among the 
intellectual society.40 
The patronage of Confucianism was prevalent in Tokugawa Japan, as Japan 
imitated the Chinese model of funding Confucianism as both administrative and 
educational policy. The majority of Confucian educational institutions were radiated 
around the nation’s capital in Edo and financially funded by the Tokugawa Bakufu. The 
Japanese authority had been funding Confucianism since its arrival in the sixth century, 
but governmental investment increased when the Tokugawa Bakufu adopted Neo-
Confucian ideology as the state’s official doctrine. The Tokugawa Bakufu revitalized the 
function of Confucian institutes as career academies that trained administrative 
personnel, more than expanding literacy and cultivating individual virtue.41 Confucian 
scholars who mastered administrative affairs entered the Tokugawa Bakufu’s 
                                               
39 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 94-96. 
40 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 78-82. 
41 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 69-70. 
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administration and received not only financial compensation but more importantly 
reputations for their accomplishment in public affairs. More and more Confucian scholars 
thus were attracted to Japan’s central and regional bureaucracies, where they exercised 
agency to draft government policies and shape public opinion.42 During their career as 
civil servants, several Confucian scholars, like members of the Hayashi family and 
Yamaga Sokô, indoctrinated the Tokugawa leadership and public with their belief in 
Japanese state’s collective identity and potential superiority among Japan’s neighboring 
regimes. 
 
Hayashi Gahô & Hôkô and Kai hentai 
The Hayashi clan was prominent in Tokugawa Japan’s public education and 
intellectual society for their achievement and authority in Neo-Confucian philosophy, 
which was endorsed by the Bakufu as the official and orthodox ideology of the state. 
Their school’s founder, Hayashi Razan constructed the Yushima Seido (“Hall of the 
Sages”), which later became Japan’s supreme educational institution when Hayashi 
Razan was appointed as the advisor and tutor to the first four Shoguns of the Tokugawa 
Bakufu. Razan contributed to Japanese legislation regarding administrative affairs, 
economic policies, and official rituals in early-Edo period, thus earning the Bakufu’s trust 
in the Hayashi clan’s loyalty and competence. 
When Hayashi Razan passed away, his son, Hayashi Gahô, succeeded Tokugawa 
Shogun’s appointment as its scholarly advisor. During Gahô’s service, Tokugawa Japan 
was alerted to the Manchu invasion of China, as unofficial trade between Japan and 
                                               
42 Paramore, Japanese Confucianism, 78-82. 
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China was interrupted due to continental turmoil. Hayashi Gahô collected intelligence 
reports gathered from merchant vessels arriving at Nagasaki port regarding the Manchu 
invasion of the Ming Dynasty. He then addressed his opinion on continental political 
incidents, thus influencing the Bakufu’s diplomatic and cultural perspective on Manchu-
governed China. When Gahô passed away, his son Hôkô took the responsibility of 
intelligence-gathering and analysis. Information acquired from merchant ships arrived in 
Japan during Gahô and Hôkô’s careers were recorded in a text called Kai hentai, which 
means the “mutation of the hua-yi dichotomy.” Kai hentai mainly discussed intelligence 
about continental affairs, particularly the resistance of the Han-Chinese rump states: 
Southern Ming (1644-1662 C.E.) and the Kingdom of Tungning (1662-1682 C.E.). 
Kai Hentai reflected Japanese Confucian scholars’ view of the Manchu invasion 
of China; further it conveyed the Tokugawa Bakufu’s official attitude on the Chinese 
dynastic transition. Though the Tokugawa Bakufu issued seclusion decrees, prohibiting 
international trade with foreign powers, except China and Netherlands, Tokugawa Japan 
still paid significant attention to the continental affairs and changes in the regional 
diplomatic environment. The Tokugawa Bakufu demanded that all foreign intelligence be 
edited and delivered to the central administration for investigation by Confucian scholars 
who served as bureaucrats and advisors.  
Hayashi Hôkô defined the Manchu conquest and subsequent governance of China 
as barbarian, because he believed that the conquerors destroyed an established political 
and social system, and damaged physical and intellectual properties. Hôkô wrote in the 
introduction of Kai Hentai that: 
Emperor Chongzhen (of the Ming dynasty) was deceased and gone to Heaven; 
the territory of Chinese mainland fell under the control of barbarians; the 
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remnants of the Han-Chinese regime seek shelter in the southwest corner of the 
continent, while the barbarian nomads rode across the Central Kingdom. These 
are indications of the mutation of civilized society into the barbarian.43 
Hôkô expressed horror at this “barbarian” invasion and conquest of China. Hôkô believed 
that China had degraded from a civilized to a barbarian state, since the old regime was 
driven to the hinterland and barbarians had the privilege to rule the vast territory. 
Nevertheless, Hayashi Hôkô failed to recognize the sinification of the Manchu 
regime, since the Qing-Dynasty China basically inherited all political institutions and 
social norms from the previous regime established by the Han-Chinese.44 The Qing 
dynasty, though it committed massacres during its military conquest, emphasized 
pacifying the public and restoring social and economic order once it consolidated its 
regime.45 Manchu conquerors recruited Han-Chinese scholars to serve in the Qing regime 
and maintained Confucianism as the official political philosophy and administrative 
principle. The hierarchical political structure of Qing dynasty was almost identical to that 
of the Ming, with only minor additional agencies that handled ethnic and religious affairs 
of the multi-national regime.46 However, The Tokugawa Bakufu regarded Hôkô’s 
narrative of Qing China’s lack of civilization as plausible, considering the Hayashi clan’s 
prominent reputation and credibility in Tokugawa political and intellectual society. 
Japanese Confucian scholars thus came to regard the Manchu invasion as the 
reverse of the hua-yi dichotomy, both degrading the Chinese civilization and implying a 
comparatively elevated status for Japan in the tributary system. Hayashi Hôkô gave a 
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more detailed narrative than his father about the Manchu invasion of Ming China and 
Han-Chinese’s resistance against the barbarians. Hôkô first discussed the establishment 
of Qing dynasty after the death of Ming dynasty’s Emperor Chongzhen: 
The fifteenth year of Emperor Chongzhen (of Chinese Ming dynasty) was the 
equivalent nineteenth year of the era name Ken’ei (of Japanese Emperor Go-
Mizunoo). In this year, Li Zicheng rebelled against the Ming regime, and his 
insurgents entered the Ming capital of Beijing in the March of the seventeenth 
year of Chongzhen. Emperor Chongzhen committed suicide on the nineteenth of 
April. Li Zicheng usurped the regime with the dynasty name of Dashun…(In the 
spring of the second year of the era name Shoho in Japan) General Wu San’gui 
defeated Li Zicheng with the barbarians’ military support, and retook Beijing. 
General Wu Sangui chased the remnants of Li Zicheng’s army to the province of 
Shanxi. Meanwhile, the Dalu (barbarians) had the control of the capital of 
Beijing. (The Manchu) changed the era name to Shunzhi, and established the 
dynasty of Qing. In May, the barbarians took control of the alternative capital of 
Nanjing…47 
Hôkô distinctively used the term Dalu (barbarians) to refer to the Manchu who occupied 
the capital of Beijing and expanded their territories. He then continued with the narration 
of the establishment of Ming rump state by an individual called Zheng Zhilong: 
Zheng Zhilong had traveled to Japan in his youth, and he sold shoes at the town 
of Hirado of Hizen province (in Kyushu) for several years…Zheng had married a 
Japanese woman and had offspring with her. Later in the first year of Emperor 
Chongzhen, he returned to his home country while his wife stayed in Hirado. At 
the time, piracy activity was overwhelming around the Chinese southern coast, 
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and Zheng participated as a pirate as well. Then Zheng submitted to the Emperor 
Chongzhen for his crime, but he was pardoned and joined the Ming dynasty’s 
armed forces. Zheng fought the piracy on the coast and was famous for his 
leadership and military achievement. Zheng was commissioned as the General of 
Fujian, becoming a renowned celebrity from a commoner. Therefore, he was 
grateful to the Ming dynasty and willing to reciprocate Emperor Chongzhen’s 
recognition. Therefore, he designated the provincial center Fuzhou as the capital, 
planning to repel the Manchu barbarians and restore the Ming dynasty.48 
Hôkô narrated the remnants of Ming-China with contempt. He did not see Zheng Zhilong 
as a noble delegate of a civilized regime, since Zheng neither had a prestigious 
background, nor was proficiently educated in a Confucian manner.49 One reason for the 
ambivalence of Tokugawa Japan’s official correspondence is that it was theoretically and 
logistically too complicated for the Bakufu’s Confucian advisors to evaluate the 
hierarchy between Tokugawa Japan and Ming remnants. 
The Tokugawa Bakufu, though admiring the earlier Ming dynasty’s prestige, 
noticed the weakness of Ming’s rump state. The regime capital resided in the trivial 
provincial capital of Fuzhou, much less esteemed than the original capital in Beijing. 
Further, nominating a former pirate as a general suggested the Southern-Ming regime’s 
lack of human resources due to consistent military failures. It would be, therefore, 
inappropriate and unacceptable under Confucian principles for the Bakufu to recognize 
the failing Southern-Ming state through a lens previously applied to the illustrious Ming-
China. The Southern-Ming regime did not attain sufficient financial capacity to afford a 
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formal diplomatic legation; thus, they only counted on individual messengers to 
communicate with Tokugawa Japan. Ming’s rump states relied on pirates to communicate 
with foreign regimes. Hayashi Hôkô recorded a private, or to an extent semi-official, 
communication between Zheng Zhilong’s regime and Tokugawa Japan: 
Zheng Zhilong, though he had the ambition to revive the Ming dynasty, had 
insufficient military strength and considered asking Japan’s military assistance. 
Thus, he dispatched Cui Zhi to Nagasaki with necessary documents and asked for 
Japan’s response. Cui Zhi was an officer under Zheng’s command.50 
The Southern-Ming state’s lack of military strength and diplomatic grandeur discouraged 
Hôkô’s effort to help Ming’s rump states seeking Japan’s support or even direct military 
intervention, since Japan’s investment could be fruitless and potentially induce Qing-
China’s retribution.  
Hôkô, in his description of the fall of Beijing, encouraged the Tokugawa Bakufu 
to recognize the Manchu leadership as “barbarian”, but his policy recommendation was 
in contradiction. 51 Hôkô praised the Southern-Ming regime’s cause of reviving the Ming-
dynasty China as the center of civilization, despite that Qing-China actually adopted 
Chinese civilization and preserved the previous dynasty’s civilized political institutions 
and social structure. Hôkô addressed his sympathy towards the Han-Chinese resistance 
against Manchus’ barbarian invasion: “(Ming-Chinese) generals and soldiers gallantly 
sacrificed their lives to protect the Emperor and preserve the regime.”52 Hôkô, based on 
practical deliberation however, did see the demand for military assistance as overly 
burdensome, as the Tokugawa Bakufu would not be able to mobilize a capable expedition 
                                               
50 Hayashi Gahō and Hayashi Hôkô, Kai Hentai. 
51 Hayashi Gahō and Hayashi Hôkô, Kai Hentai. 
52 Hayashi Gahō and Hayashi Hôkô, Kai Hentai. 
24 
 
force and aggregate a fund to support the Southern Ming regime’s counter-attack. Hôkô 
articulated his nominal appreciation of the Southern Ming’s cause of resistance but 
suggested that it would be impossible for Japan to offer assistance in reality. Hôkô 
recorded the Japanese reply to Southern Ming’s demand of troops and funds: 
Japan had not had a proper tributary relation with the Chinese Ming dynasty for 
more than a hundred years, and there had been no Japanese who had traveled to 
China. Though Chinese merchant ships arrived and conducted trade at Nagasaki 
every year, these activities were de facto illegal. Please address these replies to 
the person (from Southern Ming) and urge him to return as soon as possible.53 
Hôkô used Japan’s current non-involvement in the Tributary system, from which Japan 
had significantly benefitted in previous years, as the justification of Japan’s implicit 
refusal through the expulsion of the Southern-Ming representative. Tokugawa Japan, 
therefore, never dispatched military support or offered financial assistance to the 
Southern Ming’s military resistance against the Manchus. 
Hayashi Gahô and Hôkô compiled Kai Hentai as Confucian scholars’ collection 
of intelligence analysis of the political circumstances on the continent. The volume also 
assessed the Japanese state’s position in relation to other regimes, and reflected an early 
notion of Japan as a collective entity in a dynamic international world. Hayashi Hôkô, 
who prioritized the security and prosperity of Japan with his political deliberation, 
advanced pragmatic foreign policies to the Bakufu he served. 
 
Yamaga Sokô and Chûchô Jijitsu 
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Yamaga Sokô became an apprentice of Hayashi Razan at the age of nine. Sokô, 
after entering his adulthood however, disliked the orthodox paradigm of Neo-
Confucianism ratified by the Tokugawa Bakufu. Sokô rather suggested the return to 
ancient sages’ teachings, like the Analects by Confucius and works by the Duke of Zhou. 
Yamaga Sokô argued that individuals should embrace the virtues of piety, loyalty, and 
honesty according to classical Confucian indoctrination. Meanwhile he believed that a 
respectful Japanese samurai is a qualified Confucian with both literacy and morality. 
Sokô also disdained his colleagues’ reinterpretation of Confucianism, particularly the 
Neo-Confucianism in the Song Dynasty. Since the Neo-Confucianism advocated by the 
Hayashi clan was acknowledged as the official ideology of Tokugawa education, Yamaga 
Sokô was alienated from most Confucian scholars who were ideologically allied with the 
Hayashi clan. He was later even exiled from the capital in 1666. Nevertheless, Sokô’s 
discussion of Japan’s fundamental superiority carried historical significance for 
encouraging notions of Japanese pride. 
Yamaga Sokô recognized the notion of hua-yi dichotomy, but he further argued 
that a regime could either upgrade in the hierarchy with civilized achievements or 
degrade with civilization’s collapse. Though China had always been the center of 
civilization in the region, Japan also had the potential to acquire such a status. The term 
of “China” (中朝 in Chinese characters and Japanese kanji), Chûchô in Japanese and 
Zhongchao in Chinese, in East Asian languages not only carries the geographical notion 
of the “Middle Kingdom” but also represents the civilized status of the “Central Realm” 
(Chûchô) in the Confucian hierarchy of civilization. The geographical “China,” therefore, 
would be fixed permanently to the continent, but the cultural “China” as Chûchô 
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theoretically could be transferred between different regimes, based on their comparative 
levels of civilization. If the Chinese state became conquered by a group of barbarian 
invaders and lost control over its civilization, then that was no long qualified as the 
Chûchô, the “Central Realm.” That was because barbarians did not know how to preserve 
and utilize the civilization to its maximum benefit. Sokô thus argued that Japan, though 
previously a “peripheral realm” (外朝, Gaichô as the Japanese terminology), in the 
Confucian hierarchy of civilization, held the opportunity but also obligation to inherit the 
center of civilization after Chinese civilization’s downfall due to the Manchu invasion. 
The Japanese state thus was eligible to carry the title of “Central Realm” as well as 
Chûchô. Such an intellectual maneuver would isolate the state of China into a more 
inferior “peripheral realm” as Gaichô. Yamaga Sokô utilized the Manchu occupation of 
the continent as the opportunity to advance Japan’s innate superiority, from the 
perspective of geography, religion, politics, and military accomplishment. 
Sokô’s Chûchô Jijitsu (“facts about the ‘Central Realm’”) was a historical 
illustration of ancient Japan written in classical Chinese prose, as classical Chinese was 
the language of Confucianism and the symbol of literacy. Sokô neglected to acknowledge 
the fact that Confucianism was a system of foreign ideology from China and the whole 
Japanese intellectual community depended on a foreign language to convey the idea of 
Japanese identity; rather he considered Japanese Confucianism as a domestic intellectual 
school that had been naturalized. 
Confucianism, in both China and Japan, prioritized the legitimacy of governance 
when discussing political affairs. Yamaga Sokô therefore started the historical account 
with Japan’s political history to justify Japan’s political legitimacy. He emphasized that 
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the Emperor’s lineage was never disrupted in Japan, while dynastic change in China 
proved the continental political system’s instability. The theological foundation of 
Shintoism determined the Emperor’s divine right of governance. Sokô began his 
historical narration with a brief introduction of Japanese superiority: 
The Chûchô (meaning Japan) has a geography is far superior to all other 
countries. Its intellectuals and celebrities are the most talented in the universe. 
The divine mandate by the god, the stability and longevity through justice 
governance, the fabulous intellectual accomplishments, and glorious military 
achievements. These all indicate the heavenliness of Chûchô (Japan).54 
It is important to notice that, though educated as a Confucian scholar and writing in a 
Confucian manner, Yamaga Sokô reoriented Tokugawa Japanese scholars’ concentration 
on Confucianism to the study of early Japanese classics and the traditional religion of 
Shintoism. Sokô, therefore, contributed to the later constitution of a new Japanese 
intellectual movement, kokugaku, literally meaning “national learning.” Though he was 
exiled by the Tokugawa Bakufu for his anti-orthodox comments, kokugaku in the 
eighteen century inherited Sorai’s intellectual legacy. Those writers (as will be examined 
in chapter three) inherited Sokô’s intellectual legacy of investigating ancient Japanese 
history long after  Sokô and his kogaku, meaning Japanese classical studies, had 
disappeared from the world.  
Yamaga Sokô argued that the Japanese archipelago’s geographical advantages 
helped deter foreign invasions and maintain economic self-sufficiency. No alien power 
had ever conquered Japan, and the Mongol invasions in the late thirteenth century failed 
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as two strong typhoons struck the Mongol fleet and caused heavy casualties.55 Japan did 
not share a vast border, therefore having no necessity to build fortification against 
barbarian invasions. Sokô also noticed Japan’s geographical advantages for economic 
development. Japan’s major population resided on arable plains between coastline and 
inland mountain ranges, enjoying the natural irrigation and a transportation network 
provided by the inland waterway system.56 Thus, he argued that Japan produced 
merchandise as good as Chinese equivalents, for which Japanese had eagerly desired to 
acquire. 
Sokô recognized that the terminology of “China” could carry multiple 
implications, and he offered his justification of Japan’s superiority from a natural 
scientific perspective: 
In general, heaven has a center, earth has a center. There is the center of physical 
geography, and also the center of human geography. Therefore, the Gaichô 
(mainland China) has claimed the geographical center of the world; the birth 
place of Buddha was believed to be the medium of heaven and earth; and Jesus 
Christ said he was the ideological center granted by the heavenly god. I humbly 
believe that, only when four seasons coexist, and land becomes arable for 
agricultural production and social activities, then certain place can be regarded as 
the Chûchô¸ the Central Realm. Among all nations, only the Gaichô (mainland 
China) and the Chûchô (Japan) are qualified for this requirement. However, since 
China (Japan) has [lost] the mandate from heaven. Our Realm should be praised 
as the center of universe.57 
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It was interesting to notice Sokô’s acknowledgement of geographical advantage of 
mainland China as well, though he believed that Japan still won in this round of 
competition because of its additional religious privileges. Further, the reference to both 
Buddhism and Christianity in his justification reflected Sokô’s pre-modern worldview 
that included the presence of the west. 
 Yamaga Sokô concluded his justification of Japan’s geographical superiority by 
discussing how Japan exploited its geographical advantage: 
Our Realm has been inherently the geographical center of the universe, and 
[ancient mythical] Emperor Jimmu governed this territory with distribution and 
reorganization of lands. The location of the capital of Heian was perfectly chosen 
at the center of our territory, and it represented the virtues, upon which Chûchô 
was established.58 
This argument might seem coherent and thus persuasive to Yamaga Sokô’s contemporary 
Japanese, most of whom had not been properly indoctrinated with Japanese history. But, 
as Sokô probably knew but intentionally neglected, the urban planning of city of Heian 
was a precise imitation of the capital of Chinese Tang dynasty, Chang’an. 
The notion of military achievement is essential to Yamaga Sokô’s argument. 
Japan had acquired much higher reputation in military accomplishments than China, as 
Japan had successfully defended against nomadic Mongols’ invasions and had conquered 
the Korean Peninsula twice. China, on the other hand, was frequently under the threat of 
northern barbarians. As a consequence, Japan’s imperial lineage had been stable while 
China frequently experienced dynastic changes, as Sokô indicated: 
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The Chûchô’s imperial rule has been stable and unchanged through uncountable 
years. This is unimaginable for other nations. Other nations have been frequently 
invaded by foreigners and nomads. During the two-hundred and fifty years of the 
Spring-and-Autumn period (of China), there had been twenty-five incidents of 
kings murdered by their servants, and the case of rebellions and revolts was 
innumerous. Only this Realm has been stable for two-million year since its 
establishment. The governance of the imperial house has lasted for more than 
two-thousand and three-hundred years.59 
Yamaga Sokô concluded that Japan should be entitled as the Chûchô for the 
reasons he listed, and Japan should erect a new cultural sphere/regional order oriented by 
its own leadership. Sokô criticized his intellectual colleagues for admiring Chinese 
culture, including the imported system of Confucianism. He encouraged his fellow 
Japanese to recognize the national superiority that people had failed to realize for a long 
period of time. Sokô argued that: 
When people have viewed the endless ocean, they fail to recognize the size of 
sea. Those people who live in borderless plain, fail to recognize the magnitude of 
territory. Thus, familiarity of context hinders ones’ perception. However, is the 
context only geographical? You foolish people lived in the intellectual Chûchô, 
but fail to recognize its beauty. You only have preference for ideological classics 
from the Gaichô (China), admiring their celebrities. This is heartbreaking! This is 
disappointing! Do you merely like foreign objects? Are you merely curious about 
foreign elements?60 
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If Sokô had had the opportunity to respond to the contemporary Qing Dynasty’s effort to 
reinitiate the tributary system, he would disdain the initiative because a barbarian-led 
tributary network would degraded the whole system. Yamaga Sokô implicitly 
recommended the establishment an alternative cultural sphere, since Confucian-nurtured 
Japan, as Chûchô, was qualified for the center of civilization. Such alternative would not 
only elevate Japan’s status among other neighboring states, but also reconcile the 
barbarian threat to Japan. 
 
Japanese Confucian proto-nationalism 
One of the most essential elements of seventeenth-century Japan’s international 
relations was its diplomatic and trade relations with China. Such relations changed due to 
the rise of the Qing Dynasty, leading to new interpretations of Japan’s position in a 
Confucian ideology-derived hierarchy of civilization. The two main streams of response 
from Japan, exemplified by Hayashi Hôkô and Yamaga Sokô, demonstrated diverse 
attitudes towards the future of Japan. These might be related to the different concerns of 
their intended audiences. The Hayashi family represented the intellectual society 
endorsed by the Tokugawa Bakufu, which desired to restore and maintain the status quo.  
Hayashi Gahô and Hôkô, therefore, offered prudential and pragmatic policy 
recommendations that accorded with the Tokugawa Bakufu’s desire. Though the Hayashi 
scholars never explicitly suggested the Bakufu substitute China’s leadership in the East 
Asian Cultural Sphere, their commentary suggested a proto-nationalistic Japanese 
identity shared within Japan’s intellectual society under this diplomatic emergency. 
Yamaga Sokô promoted a more explicit and radical rhetoric of the Japanese state’s 
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superiority. Under such circumstances, Japanese Confucian scholars within both shushi-
gaku and kogaku developed notions of Japan’s pre-modern proto-nationalism, with the 
goals of serving Japan as a collective state and protecting Japan from external threats. 
They provided a sense of pride and unity, and considered the interests of Japan as a 
whole. Interestingly, this type of Japanese proto-nationalism had its origin in Tokugawa-
Japan’s Confucianism, in defiance of its foreign origins. But these intellectuals in 
seventeenth- to eighteenth-century Japan were simply turning inward; their writings were 
direct responses to the significant changes in the surrounding international environment.  
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Chapter III: Ogyū Sorai’s Japanese Confucianism and Tokugawa-Japanese Politics 
Seventeenth-century Japan witnessed the emerging crises on the Chinese 
mainland and experienced a dynamic international environment with the presence of 
western powers. The Neo-Confucian Hayashi clan and classically-oriented Yamaga Sokô 
invoked Confucian philosophy and philology to promote a diplomatic policy that 
elevated Japan’s interests. The Hayashi clan represented the Tokugawa Bakufu’s 
temperance and pragmatism in political and diplomatic affairs, and Yamaga Sokô 
proposed a more radical and progressive awareness of Japanese identity and superiority. 
Both offered the intellectual antecedents to a proto-nationalistic sentiment.  
Edo Japan, on the other hand, remained as a feudal (hōken) state with the 
Tokugawa Bakufu’s pseudo-central authority. Another voice arose the Confucian 
intellectuals took this political structure as his point of departure.61 Ogyū Sorai (1666-
1728 C.E.) compared Japan’s political structure with that of China through philology. 
Sorai believed that a state’s rites, meaning political structure and customs, must accord 
with its socio-cultural contexts. Tokugawa Japan and ancient China shared similarities in 
their social circumstances, as each was a feudal regime. Sorai, therefore, advocated that 
the earliest Confucianism in ancient China, rather than classical Confucianism or Neo-
Confucianism from more politically-centralized (gunken) dynasties, conformed best to 
Tokugawa Japan’s political demands and socio-cultural circumstances.62 The ancient-
Chinese Confucian doctrines, which Sorai referred to as the “way of early sage kings,” 
were the creation of Chinese ancient political leaders before the tenth-century B.C.E. 
These were essential to Sorai’s mission to improve “feudal” Japan’s domestic politics. 
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Sorai’s investigation and reinterpretation of ancient Confucian classics, and his 
recommendation for Japan’s optimal political system, reflected his intellectual concern 
regarding the state of Japan’s political coherence and identity. 
Ogyū Sorai, the second son of an Edo samurai, was the most prominent 
Confucian scholar in mid-Tokugawa Japan. Sorai’s father served as the personal 
physician of Tokugawa Tsunayoshi, the fifth Shogun of the Tokugawa Bakufu. Sorai had 
studied the official Neo-Confucianism, like Yamaga Sokô, as a disciple of the Hayashi 
intellectual faction; Sorai, nevertheless, never associated himself with Neo-Confucianism 
in the rest of his life.63 Neither did Sorai acknowledge Yamaga Sokô’s intellectual 
credibility.64 Sorai, once he completed his Confucian education, began his educational 
career at the age of twenty-four by establishing a private institution of Confucian classics. 
With the aim to discuss Tokugawa Japan’s optimal political system, he frequently 
engaged in debates with disciples of the shushi-gaku Hayashi clan and Yamaga’s kogaku 
school. Sorai was thus abhorred by scholars from both intellectual cohorts for his severe 
criticism of both factions. Sorai’s teaching experience did not last long, since he could 
not refuse the opportunity to enter the Tokugawa Bakufu’s bureaucracy and serve as a 
scholarly advisor under Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, one of Shogun Tsunayoshi’s senior 
councilors.65 Sorai’s position in the bureaucracy also kept him safe from other Confucian 
intellectuals’ denunciation. The Shogun’s protection of Sorai’s non-mainstream thoughts, 
however, vanished when Tsunayoshi died, and Sorai’s employer, Yoshiyasu, lost his 
privileged status and could no longer shelter Sorai. He thus left the bureaucracy in 1709 
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at the age of thirty-three under the pressure of his intellectual adversaries, and he 
thoroughly disassociated himself from Neo-Confucianism and withdrew from the 
intellectual apprenticeship of the Hayashi clan.66 
 Ogyū Sorai’s concern for Tokugawa Japan’s feudal politics persisted even though 
he no longer served the Bakufu. Sorai’s political theory was oriented around the 
preservation of Tokugawa Bakufu’s feudal governance. Though Sorai disapproved of 
Neo-Confucianism, he never discredited Confucianism’s value as a philosophy and a 
paradigm of political science in Tokugawa Japan. Sorai diverged from the Neo-
Confucian mainstream in this way.. He confronted both the Hayashi clan and Yamaga 
Sokô’s faction and argued that their theories were unsubstantiated, even heterodox by his 
standard, because of their reliance on inauthentic and inappropriate references. The 
Hayashi scholars were indoctrinated with Song-dynasty Neo-Confucianism, and Yamaga 
Sokô consulted classical-Confucian doctrines of Han and Tang-dynasty China, from 
which institutionalized Confucianism first arrived in Japan. The Han, Tang and Song 
dynasties had all been highly centralized politically. These versions of Confucianism 
consulted by the Hayashi and Yamaga Sokô, therefore, deliberated politics in the context 
of centralized regimes, instead of feudal systems like Tokugawa Japan. Sorai thus 
regarded their Confucian documents as inappropriate as intellectual references, since 
their content did not match Tokugawa Japan’s feudal-political circumstances.67 Because 
Sorai found both classical Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism at the time ineffective as 
a branch of political science, he turned to the more archaic Confucian classics which 
originated China’s feudal era.  
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Sorai thus believed that only the ancient version of Confucianism from the 
Chinese feudal era could help consolidate Tokugawa Japan’s politics. He emphasized 
Confucian philology, meaning the precise examination of documents to identify 
intellectual evidence, as his methodology of investigation.  Edo-Japanese Confucian 
scholars thus categorized Sorai’s school of philology as kobunjigaku, “the study of 
ancient language,” alongside Sorai’s intellectual competitors from shushigaku and 
kogaku.68 Sorai sought Japan’s optimal political structure by investigating what he 
identified as the ancient, thus reliable, Confucian classics: the “Six Classics.” These 
ancient Confucian documents from China’s Spring-and-Autumn and Warring-States 
period (circa fifth-century B.C.E.) served as Sorai’s vital references, based on which he 
contemplated administrative alternatives for Japan’s domestic politics in the transition 
between the seventeenth- and eighteenth century. Utilizing a different set of Confucian 
classics as his intellectual references, Ogyū Sorai constructed a political paradigm that 
served Tokugawa Japan’s state interests. 
Sorai’s standards for evaluating documents’ credibility was strict to an extreme. 
Sorai, though a genuine believer of Confucianism, remained cautious in investigating the 
credibility of even Confucius’ own Analects, which almost all Confucian scholars held as 
the ultimate in intellectual orthodoxy.69 Sorai was suspicious about the Analects, because 
the document was a posthumous collection of Confucius’ ideas, edited by Confucius’ 
followers. The editors, surely less astute than Confucius as Sorai believed, were likely to 
inaccurately recall or interpret the master’s instructions.70 Sorai raised the case of Itô 
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Jinsai as the example of Confucian scholars who falsely interpreted and carelessly trusted 
Confucius’s Analects: 
 In recent years, there was Mr. Ito (Jinsai), another eminent and brilliant 
scholar…However, Mr. Ito interpreted the Analects in terms of the Mencius; also, 
he read works of ancient literature in terms of modern literature. (Thus,) he 
simply remained a part of the school of Masters Cheng and Master Zhu (of Song-
China Neo-Confucianism). In addition, Jinsai publicly distinguished the way of 
the early kings and that of Confucius as two (different) ways. Jinsai also retreated 
from the Six Classics and took his ideas exclusively from the Analects.71 
In contrast, Ogyū Sorai held that ancient Confucianism’s “Six Classics” as fundamentally 
vital to his investigation of the “way of early sage kings.” This was because Confucius 
himself had credited these documents as reliable intellectual products by ancient sages. 
Sorai continued: 
 Confucius was born at the end of the Zhou dynasty, and he had a difficult time 
pursuing a position in public service. Therefore, Confucius retreated from politics 
with his students to study the way of early sage kings. Confucius and his students 
discussed and defined the way, and later Confucian scholars recorded and 
distributed the way. The Six Classics were the collection of the way.72 
“Fundamentalist” may not be the most accurate term to characterize Sorai, but he trusted 
the earliest Confucian classics as the most credible sources. 
 Ogyū Sorai believed that Tokugawa Japan’s contemporary rites should function 
like those of ancient China. Sorai absolutely embraced China’s cultural superiority, 
recognizing the importation of the written language and intellectual knowledge from 
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China, unlike Yamaga Sokô, who wrote in Chinese but refused to recognize Japan’s 
dependence on Chinese as the source of its written language. Sorai’s China-centric 
intuition differentiated him from Sokô and the later Japan-centric kokugaku (“national 
learning”) scholars who will be discussed in the fourth chapter. But like Sokô, Sorai was 
concerned with what the Edo Japanese perceived as the long-lasting perpetuity and 
stability of Japan. Sokô considered Japan’s existence and prosperity in a complex 
international environment; Sorai, on the other hand, expressed opinions about the suitable 
form of governance in Japan, considering domestic socio-economic factors.  
 Since Sorai preferred to apply his Confucian knowledge to the realm of domestic 
politics instead of international relations, he wrote in political philosophy and suggested a 
model for Japan. Sorai analyzed what he perceived as the “authentic” Confucian political 
philosophy in three volumes, titled Bendô, Benmei, and Rongocho (“Discussing the 
Way”, “Discussing the Name”, and “Discussing the Analects”). These documents were 
narratives of Sorai’s Confucian philosophy and corresponding political doctrines. Sorai, 
unlike other Confucian scholars who discussed the “way” regarding its significance in 
individuals’ morality, specified the “way” as the guideline of civic administration and 
state politics. Most of his argumentation thus regarded Confucianism as a political 
philosophy. The notions of “sages” and “Six Classics,” along with the “way,” composed 
the three essential features of Sorai’s political theory. Sorai characterized ancient 
morally-justified Chinese political leaders as “sages,” who inspired Confucius and other 
early Confucian scholars to pursue righteous governance in their contemporary period of 
feudal fragmentation and political instability. While Confucius’ later disciples, like 
Mencius, supposed that all individuals have the human agency to explore and implement 
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the “way,” Sorai refuted them by arguing that only the early “sages” were capable of 
determining the “way” of political society. Sorai argued: 
The way is a generalizing term. It is the integration of rituals, ceremonial music, 
legal codes, and political system established by early sage kings.73 
Because these early king “sages” retained their philosophy in the collection of “Six 
Classics,” Sorai believed that political righteousness in the era of early “sages” could be 
reinvigorated in the similar environment of feudal Tokugawa Japan, and such revival was 
accessible only by reinvestigating ancient Confucian documents. In Sorai’s philological 
synthesis: the “sages” created the “way” according to the doctrines within the “Six 
Classics.” 
As Sorai emphasized the term “way” in the title of his intellectual masterpiece 
Bendô, the “way” was the most significant pivot of his political philosophy. Bendô 
started with Sorai discussing the perpetuity and continuity of the “way.” Sorai suggested 
that though the term “way” had been frequently discussed by Confucian scholars 
throughout different periods, scholarly dialogue yielded different definitions instead of 
forming a consensus. This was because Confucian scholars judged the “way” with 
different standards based on their contemporary socio-cultural circumstances—whether 
feudal or centralized. Confucian scholars, including Confucius’ direct descendants, 
reinterpreted either Confucius’ or “early sage kings”’ ideology of the “way” according to 
changing socio-cultural customs. These erroneous reinterpretations led to 
misunderstandings of Confucian political doctrines and the emergence of what Sorai 
regarded as unauthentic Confucian “heterodoxies” adopted by his intellectual adversaries. 
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And Confucian intellectual society in China not only failed to end the cyclical dynastic 
change and subsequent social chaos, but also encountered internal intellectual 
confrontation that disintegrated intellectual society.  While educated social elites failed to 
unite and collaborate, the Chinese public suffered from antagonism between opposing 
classes and communities.74 In Sorai’s perspective, a long-lasting and stability-
guaranteeing “way” should be the “way of early sage kings.”  
Sorai gave credit to Confucius for synthesizing the way: 
Confucius’ way is the way of early sage kings. The way of early sage kings was 
established for the purpose of pacifying the public...it is a set of rules and cannot 
be briefly summarized. Since the way is a complicated paradigm…Confucianism 
indoctrinates people with the understanding of the way.75 
Sorai’s argument was contrary to what argued by the officially-endorsed Japanese 
Neo-Confucian scholars, who recognized that the “way” was a pre-existing social 
convention that naturally existed in the society rather than an intentional artifice 
fabricated even by most wise “sage kings.”76 Neo-Confucianism indicated the “way” as a 
notion shaped by society in collective without individual interference, since Neo-
Confucianism believed what existed was thus reasonable.77 Neo-Confucian scholars, for 
instance Itō Jinsai, advocated this understanding of the “way.” Jinsai discussed how the 
“way” was a set of social values and principles formed during social experiences. Once 
naturally shaped, this set of social values and behavioral principles became publicly 
recognized by the intellectual elites and commoners. Jinsai argued: 
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 Anything that does not oppose social righteousness should be categorized as part 
of social convention, and social convention is the way…the public hold their 
consensus in the social convention.78 
Sorai rejected Jinsai’s social approach and reiterated the sage-oriented origin of the 
“way.” Sorai refuted Jinsai’s argument: 
Jinsai’s interpretation reflects his lack of knowledge of the way. The way was 
established by the early sages. How can social convention recognized by the 
public be regarded as the way?79 
Sorai argued that early sage kings created political establishments and social 
norms, as rites, including rituals, ceremonies, rules of punishment and administration, to 
stabilize and perpetuate the feudal system. An ideal Confucian society functioned 
according such pre-established mechanism of rites instructed by the “sages”, and society-
oriented notions could hardly be considered as the “way.”80 Beside theoretical 
confrontation with Japanese Neo-Confucian scholars, Sorai criticized the religious 
interpretation that denied the secular creation of the “way.” He rejected the interpretation 
of the “way” as a product of heaven and earth in particular to confront the Neo-Confucian 
interpretation, since Buddhist and Daoist religions influenced Chinese Confucians when 
they constituted this Confucian sect. Sorai argued that the “early sage kings,” as human 
beings, finalized the contents of the established “way” through laborious construction.81 
Further, Neo-Confucianism’s methodologies of introspection and meditation to achieve 
an individual-level “way” were also sharply criticized by Sorai. Some scholars affiliated 
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with Neo-Confucianism participated in meditative introspection that facilitated their 
understanding of their inner selves. Sorai regarded such practice as a waste of time and 
effort because the true “way” had already been founded by the ancient sages and was 
presented in written documents. He argued that only accordance with the sages’ 
established rules and rituals would enhance ones’ morality and values.82 Sorai’s complete 
disregard of an abstract “way” gained from meditation suggested his philological 
insistence on written guidance recorded in ancient classics. 
Sorai’s “fundamentalist” Confucianism politicized the Confucian philosophy, as 
he defined Confucian studies as a public affair instead of private devotion. In contrast, 
Neo-Confucian scholars respected individuals’ inner-sphere and capability of 
introspection. Neo-Confucianism expected followers to apply realizations acquired from 
introspection to a broader public sphere. Thus, the public and private spheres were 
intermingled in the Neo-Confucian conception.83 On the contrary, Sorai’s school strictly 
separated the private and public spheres from each other and demanded individuals’ 
absolute submission to public politics. And Sorai prioritized Confucian political 
philosophy in the public sphere. The public sphere was organized into a highly 
hierarchical social structure, which was designed according to the early “sages” 
principles and the “way” that they established.84 Though Sorai never explicitly discussed 
it, this social stratification perfectly served Tokugawa Japan’s feudal society by elevating 
the aristocratic leadership and intellectual society. Sorai, therefore, by transforming the 
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“way” from individual’s moral guidance to a state’s development, restricted 
Confucianism to a political perspective. 
 
Indigenization and Politicization of Confucianism 
 Ogyū Sorai was credited by Kiri Paramore as the most influential Confucian 
scholar in the Japanese intellectual history for his indigenization and politicization of 
Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan.85 Sorai’s interpretation of Confucian ideology and the 
“Six Classics” also separated Japanese Confucian studies from mainland Chinese 
influence, because only Sorai’s Japanese Confucianism held the notion of the “way of 
early sages” and the documents of the “Six Classics” as sole references and rejected any 
other Confucian document’s authenticity. Sorai’s Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan, with 
its own central principle and intellectual guidance, was a unique intellectual paradigm. 
Japanese Confucianism after Ogyū Sorai, though with the name of “Confucianism” and a 
philological methodology inherited from the Chinese mainland, evolved into a domestic 
Japanese intellectual paradigm resistant to reinterpretation and criticism. This intellectual 
turn anticipated the future development of Japan’s indigenous proto-nationalistic 
paradigms of Kokugaku and Mitogaku (“Mito studies,” also to be discussed in the fourth 
chapter), which utilized Japanese Confucianism to promulgate Japan-centric ideologies in 
the nineteenth century. Regarding Sorai’s effort to politicize Confucianism, he exerted 
effort in adapting Confucianism to Tokugawa Japan’s socio-political environment 
through two novel but deceitful approaches: defusing the tension between the “way” and 
“kingship” (political authority) and redefining the group of “sages.” 
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Tokugawa Japan’s Neo-Confucianism recognized a close relationship between the 
“way” and “kingship.” The “kingship” of the ruler was inevitably in conflict with the 
“way” of the ruled public, as Japanese Neo-Confucian scholars perceived, because of 
class hierarchy. Tokugawa Neo-Confucians adopted Mencius (the collection of Mencius’ 
intellectual correspondences) to address this problem. Mencius, the second most 
significant Chinese Confucian master after Confucius, believed that it would be optimal 
but practically difficult to integrate the “way” and “kingship” into what he called the 
Wang Dao (king’s way), which indicated political prosperity and perpetuity.86 The public 
composed by common individuals, as Mencius believed, practiced the authority to 
determine the regime’s continuity, or could overthrow it. From the contemporary 
perspective in the twenty-first century, Mencius’ Confucianism indicated the early origin 
of popular or, to a certain extent, democratic politics in East Asia. Mencius believed that 
whoever was in power actually held no agency to determine power-transition between 
regimes and dynasties. Dynastic and regime change were rather driven by the popular 
preferences of the masses. When a king-in-power failed to rule in a moral and benevolent 
manner, a challenger endorsed by the public ought to replace his predecessor, therefore 
constituting a dynastic change.87 The change, nevertheless, almost always involved 
violent bloodshed and disturbed social peace. When asked what should happen if the 
“way” and “kingship” opposed each other, or if the “kingship” betrayed the righteous 
“way” of governance, Mencius gave a revolutionary response: the public held the 
opportunity for revolt against the administration in power to resurrect a moral and 
benevolent government. This government, to be exact, would still be a monarchy headed 
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by a new dynasty rather than a democratic republic.88 Mencius commented on the civil 
rebellion against the King Zhou of the Shang dynasty in this way, as his justification of 
people’s revolt against oppressive tyrants: 
 A king who violated the virtues of benevolence and morality is merely a common 
man. I only heard a man called Zhou was killed (for his faults), but have not 
learnt anything about the criminal murdering of a king.89 
Mencius’ theory exonerated public revolt and violence against authority. From Sorai’s 
perspective, Mencius’ argumentation of integrating the “way” and “kingship” and 
justification of righteous rebellion would be very threatening towards a society’s peace. If 
the Japanese civilian public were indoctrinated with the Confucian ideology of public 
revolt against what they perceived as an immoral and unbenevolent leadership, then 
Japan, currently enjoying stability under the Tokugawa Bakufu’s feudal administration, 
would likely enter chaotic dynastic cycles like the Chinese mainland. Besides the 
possibility of popular insurrections, the feudal society of Tokugawa Japan as well might 
face the threat of daimyo revolts, for which rebels could justify using Mencius’ popular 
definition of the “way.” 
 Sorai responded by redefining the terms. He firstly defined the “way” as “the way 
of early sage kings,” therefore removing justifications for the public to revolt according 
to their own notion of the “way.” Sorai, not daring to absolutely reject Mencius’ 
intellectual authority, revised Mencius’ integration of the “way” with “kingship”. From 
Sorai’s perspective, the “way” was constituted during the “kingship” of “early sage 
kings.” These “early sage kings” established the system of morality and benevolence, 
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which theoretically existed eternally. Ogyū Sorai, therefore, removed the threatening 
potential of integrating the “way” and “kingship” into a righteous “king’s way,” by 
arguing for a “way of early sage kings”. Seeing the “way” as pre-established by the 
“early sage kings” millennia ago, only those “sage kings” had the agency to further 
develop and interpret the notion of the “way.” As Sorai’s manipulation of ideology 
suggested, the “early sage kings” who founded these political rites could not return from 
death to offer reinterpretations. Sorai undermined any effort by which domestic 
opposition might utilize the notion of the “way” to justify any revolt against the existing 
regime.90 Sorai’s political philosophy, therefore, sought to maintain Tokugawa-Japanese 
state’s political integrity and stability. 
Sorai further diffused the political threat from other sects of Confucianism by 
narrowing the definition of the “way” to the political context only. Confucius defined the 
“way” as a general philosophical guidance of one’s behavior and speech; Sorai narrowed 
the definition of the “way” into a set of political principles.91 Sorai reimagined 
Confucius’ dialogues over moral issues as political discourses. Thus, Confucius’ 
commentary on the “way” was limited by Sorai to the extent of political philosophy, 
which again emphasized domestic stability and pacification of the public.92 
The other strategy that Sorai used to politicize Confucianism in the context of 
Tokugawa Japan was redefining the group of the “sages” to justify rulers’ political 
agency. Neo-Confucian scholars conventionally utilized the term “sages” to describe 
people who achieved moral superiority with internal introspection and self-perfection on 
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the individual level. However, Ogyū Sorai redefined the term, as he limited the use and 
interpretation of the term to political leadership. Sorai only used “sages” to describe 
ancient Chinese rulers, though both classical Confucian and Neo-Confucian scholars 
would regard individuals with perfect moral principles as “sages.” Sorai argued that the 
sages were credited for their policy accomplishments, not their private introspective 
philosophy: 
 The sage is the title for early sage kings…This title represented tremendous 
accomplishments that are rare throughout the history…However, the intellectual 
society has been obsessed with the Neo-Confucianism’s notion of internal 
cultivation prior to external implementation. Therefore, the scholars have 
neglected the Confucian way as the way of early sage kings. Their 
misinterpretation of the way is pathetic.93 
 An extensively controversial feature of Sorai’s definition of the “sages” was that 
Sorai excluded Confucius, the founder of Confucianism, from the sage community, 
because Confucius was a civilian intellectual rather than an aristocratic ruler. Sorai 
defined the “sage” as one who established new set of traditions, values, and rules when 
dynastic changes occurred. These qualifications could only be achieved by individuals 
with political power and opportunity. Sorai acknowledged Confucius’ reconstruction of 
virtuous ideological and ritual systems, but Confucius did not establish these apparatuses. 
Confucius recovered these ancient rites throughout his philological investigation of the 
“Six Classics.” Sorai argued that Confucius was only able to illustrate these systems. 
Sorai believed that Confucius unfortunately missed the opportunity to be one of the 
“sages”: 
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Confucius was born in an inappropriate time, therefore not having the 
opportunity to carry the responsibility of establishing (tradition, policy, or 
rule)…Confucius traveled around in pursuit of the way of early sage kings, 
categorized and corrected. Finally, a grand collection was created by Confucius 
as the form of the Six Classics.94 
Confucius could not re-construct moral and political rites of Confucianism without the 
“early sage kings”’ establishing their dynasties and assuring social stability; but these 
dynasties became the opportunity for Confucius to revisit the ancient classics and acquire 
inspirations. Only political leaders, kings, monarchs could be entitled the “sages” within 
Sorai’s criteria. 
Ogyū Sorai emphasized that the “way of early sage kings” was acquired from the 
studies of the “Six Classics” crafted by the “sages” themselves, including Classic of 
Poetry, Book of Documents, Book of Rites, and Book of Changes (Shi Jing, Shang Shu, Li 
Ji, Yi Jing). There are only five extant volumes because of the loss of the Book of 
Music.95 Sorai elevated “pacifying the people” as the most necessary feature of the “way” 
of early “sages,” because pacification of the public would facilitate social stability and 
generate physical and intellectual nourishment. 
The religious piety in supernatural powers was a prerequisite in Sorai’s notion of 
the “sages.” Though Sorai described the “way” as an artificial notion created by the 
“sages,” instead of a divine-generated element condensed through a natural progress, 
Sorai believed that the “sages” constructed the “way” according to a heavenly respectful 
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manner. Sorai quoted Confucius’ Analects, the document that Sorai regarded as 
politically inappropriate and intellectually not credible: 
The sage kings followed the heaven’s mandate when governing their population. 
Therefore, they were able to achieve stability and order. So, respecting the 
heaven is important.96 
Heaven or earth, therefore, was not directly involved in the creation of the “way”, but the 
mandate from the heaven or earth was necessary to facilitate the “sages’” construction. 
The “sages” must behave respectfully to both heaven and the earth in order to acquire 
such a supernatural mandate. Sorai’s reinterpretation of early Chinese Confucian classics 
derived a lot from his private perceptions Like Han-dynasty Confucian scholar Dong 
Zhongshu, Sorai embraced the ideology of the mandate of heaven.97 Human beings, even 
Sorai’s “sages,” could not voluntarily advance their morality to be qualified as the 
“sages,” but need assistance from a supernatural power. Thus, being religiously pious 
was a mandatory requirement for the “sages.” 
 In Sorai’s view, the “sages” who established the “way” served multiple functions 
in a Confucian society: they were moral examples; they established righteous political 
systems; and furthermore, they were mandated by a supernatural force to mediate 
between heavenly and civilian affairs. From these aspects, one can recognize the 
relevance of his interpretation to the political context of Tokugawa Japan: though never 
explicitly addressed, Sorai saw the Tokugawa Shogun as having the potential of being the 
“sage” of the feudal Tokugawa Japan. 
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 When Japan entered the middle of Tokugawa Period, social stability had been 
consolidated along with economic growth and intellectual cultivation, but the state was 
still politically fragmented under a feudal system. Ogyū Sorai was aware of the state’s 
political circumstances, and he was concerned about the danger of insurrections, by 
which the public or militarily powerful daimyos might undermine the state’s stability. 
Sorai also worried about the presence of what he regarded as heterodox Confucianism 
that tempted rebellion against the Tokugawa regime. Sorai, with his concerns for the 
Japanese state, concentrated on a domestic political philosophy to preserve Japan’s state 
interests. Sorai utilized his intellectual analyses, sometimes even intentional revisions, of 
early Chinese Confucian classics to establish a set of political rites that facilitated the 
notion of the “way of early sage kings” in Tokugawa Japan. 
 Sorai’s reinterpretations of Confucianism aimed to consolidate the Tokugawa 
Bakufu’s regime and pacify the public. Because of Sorai’s previous service under the 
Shogun’s senior councilors, he was inclined to empower the Bakufu’s administration. 
Sorai, therefore, revitalized the notion of the “sages,” who established new moral and 
righteous political systems, to justify the Tokugawa Shoguns’ authority. Though Sorai 
never explicitly discussed his political philosophy in the context of Tokugawa Bakufu, he 
implied that the Tokugawa Shogun were the “sages” as defined in Bendô. The civil 
obedience towards the Tokugawa Shogun thus became necessary, because Confucian 
morality demanded individuals’ submission to the “sage kings.” His ideas thus 
consolidated the Shogun’s governing legitimacy over a collective national body of Japan. 
Sorai’s effort to indigenize Confucianism in the context of Tokugawa Japan, with the 
“way of early sage kings” as the only political doctrine and the “Six Classics” as the only 
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authentic political references, reconstituted Japanese Confucianism as an independent 
intellectual paradigm. Japanese Confucianism since Ogyū Sorai’s reinterpretation entered 
a track of indigenous development without continental intellectual interference. Sorai 
never explicitly discussed the notion of a collective national identity nor raised a 
conceptualization of anything that might be termed proto-nationalism; but Sorai’s 
ideological contributions laid the intellectual foundation for the rise of nineteenth-century 
kokugaku and mitogaku schools, which fostered the formal institutionalization of 
Japanese nationalism in the late-nineteenth century. Paradigms of Kokugaku and 
Mitogaku and their political philosophies coincidentally shared Sorai’s emphasis on 
religious piety.98 
Ogyū wanted to defend his view of eighteenth-century Tokugawa Japan as a 
feudal society just like ancient China, from which he drew his intellectual Confucian 
inspiration. Maruyama Masao, in Studies of the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, 
regarded Sorai’s intellectual essence as a reactionary response toward economic and 
social transformation in the early eighteenth-century Japan.99 Maruyama noted that 
Tokugawa-Japan’s growing commercial economy gradually substituted the natural 
economy “mediated by land and realized within a very restricted circle” within the 
community-based feudal master-servant relationship. Eighteenth-century political 
stability facilitated the commercialization of agricultural and manufacturing industries. 
Wealth, instead of hierarchical status, enfranchised social influence. Merchants, who 
were at the bottom of Tokugawa social hierarchy but with capital accumulation, attained 
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social mobility to acquire respect. Eighteenth-century Japanese became aware of their 
involvement in a broader social context because of the commercialization of 
production.100 But Sorai disdained such liberation from the social hierarchy as stipulated 
by Confucian doctrine. His fundamentalist methodology of kobunjigaku urged the return 
to Confucian political rites and the rigid social stratification in a Confucian feudal 
society. Maruyama credited Sorai for his rediscovery and emphasis of politics, since 
Sorai decoupled the political system from a Confucian moral paradigm. Sorai held a 
utilitarian and pragmatic perspective towards Confucianism as a political philosophy, 
more than a set of moral doctrines. But more importantly, Maruyama argued that Sorai’s 
work opened an “intellectual beachhead for an attack on Confucianism.”101 Though Sorai 
indigenized Confucianism, his admiration of Confucianism as an intellectual system 
imported from China infuriated hostile, Japan-centric intellectuals. Confucianism was not 
necessarily always utilized as an affirmative reference by proto-nationalist scholars, but 
sometimes became the target of attack from Japanese proto-nationalists for its 
fundamental association with China. After Sorai openly advertised his politicization of 
Confucianism with the publication of his books, Japanese scholars, particularly in the 
paradigms of kokugaku and mitogaku, began their criticism of Confucianism. 
Nevertheless, these scholars continued practicing Confucianism’s methodology of 
philological research and analysis, implying that Confucianism continued to serve both 
corroborative and contrapuntal functions in their argumentation. 
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Chapter IV: Towards Anti-Confucianism: kokugaku and mitogaku 
 
While Ogyū Sorai was fascinated with the ancient Confucian classics and the 
“way of early sage kings,” other Japanese intellectuals did not appreciate Sorai’s 
affection for China and Chinese culture. Japan, since the beginning of the Tokugawa era, 
had no official diplomatic relations with China, and Japan had directly confronted China 
during Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea, a century before Sorai developed his 
intellectual positions.102 Tokugawa-Japanese intellectuals were therefore ambivalent 
about Japan’s attitude towards China. Yamasaki Ansai (1619–82), a Buddhist monk and 
later Neo-Confucian scholar, asked his students that, if Confucius and Mencius led an 
army to invade Japan, how should Japan should respond? While young Neo-Confucian 
scholars were hesitant to answer, Ansai gave his response: Japan should organize and 
resist Confucius and Mencius’ aggression, because this is a righteous decision based on 
what Confucius and Mencius have always proposed.103 When facing the ideological 
conflict between cultural affiliation to China and Japan’s national security and integrity, 
Ansai’s response symbolized the ideology of some intellectuals who used to be 
Confucian scholars but turned against Confucianism for its Chinese origins and conflict 
with Japan’s cultural values. These scholars thus anticipated the intellectual factions of 
kokugaku, the national learning school, and mitogaku, the Mito school—both of which 
recognized Japan’s proto-nationalistic identity. Sorai’s Confucian ideology, though 
openly rejected and avoided, still showed surprising influence; his Confucian 
methodology of philology continued to prosper in Tokugawa Japan’s intellectual society. 
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Kokugaku 
The philological methodology of Sorai’s kobunjigaku focused on Chinese 
Confucian classics. Surprisingly, it also influenced kokugaku (“national learning”), or the 
nativist, approach towards political philosophy and theology. Kokugaku scholars 
sympathized with Sorai’s precise examination of language’s accuracy and authenticity. 
Kada no Azumamaro (1669-1736) made significant contributions to the ideology and 
methodology of kokugaku. Azumamaro served as a Shinto priest at the Fushimi-Inari 
Shrine in the city of Kyoto. He recognized the value of Sorai’s philology, as Sorai 
believed in the interconnection and interdependency between written text, interpretation, 
and religio-philosophical understanding. Azumamaro, however unlike Sorai, had no 
pious sentiment towards the Chinese classics. Rather he believed that the urgent objective 
was to comprehensively understand Japanese classics through the same method, rather 
than interpreting the foreign documents of Confucianism. Azunomamaro noted that: 
There are few explanations for the old Japanese words…If the old words are not 
understood, the old meanings will not be clear. If the ancient meanings (kogi) are 
not clear, the ancient learning (kogaku) will not revive. The way of the former 
kings is disappearing; the ideas of the wise men of antiquity have almost been 
abandoned. The loss will not be a slight one if we fail not to teach philology.104 
It is interesting to notice that the object of Azumamaro’s philology was old Japanese 
texts, and he referred to the Japanese personages in this literature as “former kings” and 
“wise men of antiquity,” which were terms Sorai used to describe ancient Chinese 
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figures. Azumamaro submitted a petition to the eighth Shogun of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 
Yoshimune, asking for governmental funding for Japanese philological research. 
Azumamaro further volunteered his service to devote acquaintance in rhetoric and 
philology to the Japanese nativist learning. Azumamaro urged the establishment of a 
nativist learning institution, because “the rise or the fall of Japanese learning depends on 
whether or not my plan is accepted.”105 Azumamaro suggested that a unique Japanese 
way of governance and social progress could be revived by examining the old Japanese 
classics, through the methodology of Sorai’s kobunjigaku. Azumamaro insinuated that 
only the “way” of the “sages” acquired from Japanese classics could represent the 
Japanese spirit.106 
The late-seventeenth-century interplay between Sorai’s kobunjigaku and 
Azumamaro’s kokugaku was perpetuated by the disciples of both schools into the 
eighteenth century. Dazai Shundai (1680-1747) from Sorai’s school published an 
explication of Sorai’s Bendo, while Kamo no Mabuchi (1697-1769), who supported the 
nativist learning approach, organized a counter-attack with his Kokuiko (Study of the Idea 
of a Nation). 
Shundai, inheriting Sorai’s argument of “the way of the sages,” suggested that 
Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shintoism are integrally interrelated, but Confucianism 
was by nature and theory superior to the other two.107 He further argued that Shintoism 
conformed with the Book of Changes as part of the Confucian classics. Shintoism was 
thus integral to “the way of the sages” and could not exist as an independent ideology 
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from Confucianism. Shundai denounced Buddhism’s uselessness, because Buddhism 
lacked concerns about individuals’ participation in politics and discarded human 
sentiments and passions. By contrast, Confucianism and its “way of the sages” had 
consistently facilitated order and stability in Japanese society. Shundai then concluded 
that Confucianism was the superior and most important among all ideological paradigms 
available in Tokugawa Japan.108 Since Confucianism and “the way of the sages” 
originated in continental China, its notion of the “way” always had Chinese 
characteristics, and the naturally Chinese way could not be nurtured separately in Japan. 
Shundai thus suggested that kokugaku scholars intentionally fabricated the nativist 
learning school’s definition of the Japanese way. If the nativist learning scholars 
depended on the Chinese writing system to convey their beliefs, as Shundai suggested, 
they should not be contemptuous of China’s cultural influence on Japan.109 
The nativist learning school perceived Dazai Shundai’s conclusion of Japan’s 
reliance on Chinese culture as an intellectual provocation, and they responded with 
Mabuchi’s Kokuiko (“the discussion of the national spirit”). Mabuchi did not believe that 
Japan’s utilization of Chinese as the written language was inevitable, though he admitted 
that Japan had borrowed the written language from China and applied it to intellectual 
discourse and political administration.110 He speculated that there had been an indigenous 
writing system in Japan’s antiquity before the introduction of written Chinese; 
nevertheless, the existence of an antique system of Japanese writing remained in the 
realm of Mabuchi’s speculation.111 But, based on this notion, Mabuchi opposed the 
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continuing use of written Chinese as the language of intellectual and political deliberation 
in Japan. He advocated using the syllabic alphabet derived from vernacular Japanese. 
Mabuchi’s rebuttal to Shundai went beyond the issue of the use of Chinese language. 
Regarding Shundai’s argument that “the way of the sages” (of political rites and moral 
philosophy) was established in ancient China, Mabuchi answered with empirical 
evidence based on an analysis of foreign visitors to Japan. By observing Dutch merchants 
and missionaries in Nagasaki, Mabuchi affirmed that Dutch people held their unique way 
of living, while China for sure never exerted influence on shaping the Dutch way in the 
Netherlands.112 Mabuchi and other Tokugawa Japanese scholars, unlike their Chinese 
counterparts, held a multi-polar worldview. The cultural sphere that Japan and China 
belonged to was merely one cultural pole among other coexisting civilizations. Tokugawa 
Japanese viewed westerners, who represented distinctive cultures, as people from 
unfamiliar yet independent civilizations, while the Chinese mentality was usually to 
presume cultural superiority over western visitors and assume the universality of Chinese 
thought.113 Mabuchi asserted the Shinto divinity of “the heart of heaven and earth” in 
creating the way of governing; in contrast, he implied that Sorai’s way amounted to 
human diligence rather than supernatural composition.114 
Regarding the way’s utility, Mabuchi argued that Sorai’s “way of the sages” 
could not rescue Chinese from chaos caused by dynastic cycles, because relying on “such 
specious ideas” was not sufficient to maintain a country’s prosperity and prevent it from 
declining.115 Mabuchi returned to contemporary Japanese politics and concluded his 
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Kokuiko by accusing Confucianism of causing domestic instability in Japan. Mabuchi 
recognized that many Japanese scholars were obsessed with Chinese learning and 
expected to find a resolution of domestic issues through Confucianism. Therefore, 
Mabuchi condemned Confucianism from China for disturbing Japan’s domestic stability: 
“no sooner were they (Confucian ideologies) introduced then rebellions and calamities 
began.”116 Mabuchi’s statement was somehow accurate, as Japanese political 
fragmentation intensified after the introduction of Confucianism in the fifth to sixth 
centuries; Confucianism, however, did signficantly facilitate Japan’s political 
centralization in the seventh-century.117 Mabuchi argued that Japanese collectively form a 
nation of honesty and virtue, while China is a country of “wicked-heartedness, [and] no 
amount of profound instruction could keep the innate evil from overwhelming it.”118 
Confucianism, for whose political utility Chinese and Sorai school scholars admired, had 
no practical function in Japan. Kamo no Mabuchi, like Yamaga Sokô, advanced the 
notion of Japanese superiority over China. But Mabuchi gave a more extensive argument, 
criticizing not only continuous instability on the continent but also Chinese nation’s 
immorality, while praising Japanese’s virtuous qualities. 
 Kamo no Mabuchi came to the attention of a youthful scholar living at Matsusaka 
in the mid-eighteenth century, and this scholar offered Mabuchi accommodation when 
Mabuchi was on his way to the Ise Shrine in 1763. This young man, whom Mabuchi 
indoctrinated during his stay, was Motoori Norinaga, later the most distinguished scholar 
in the kokugaku school. Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) was significant among Japanese 
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kokugaku intellectuals because he utilized Confucian philology to determine that the 
Kojiki was the oldest surviving Japanese document and therefore carried the religious and 
intellectual identity of Japanese nation.119 
Norinaga’s intellectual works reflected influence from eighteenth-century 
Japanese socio-economic changes. Norinaga was born in a merchant family, which 
acquired wealth but was nominally at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The Motoori 
family’s economic ability enabled Norinaga to receive education in a Confucian fashion 
and became a scholar with social prestige.120 Though he emerged as a Confucian 
intellectual, Norinaga concluded in 1757 that Confucianism had little use to him 
privately, nor was Confucianism useful to Tokugawa Japan. Norinaga argued that 
Confucianism dealt with “ruling a country, pacifying the whole world under heaven, and 
keeping people content.” But the “way of the sages” had no use in Japan because there 
was “no country to rule and no people to gratify” when Japan remained as a state with 
local administrative autonomy.121 Unlike Sorai’s politicization of Confucianism as a 
guide for governance, Norinaga thoroughly denounced Confucianism’s political utility. 
Norinaga’s criticism of Confucianism was in fact largely criticism of Sorai’s 
interpretation. This characteristic of intellectual debate indicated that kokugaku scholars’ 
consistent and marked hostility towards Confucianism was really opposition to Ogyū 
Sorai throughout the mid- and late-Tokugawa period. 
Norinaga, like Azumamaro and Mabuchi, argued that the virtuous “Japanese 
heart” had been corrupted by the “Chinese heart” imbedded in Confucianism, and the 
                                               
119 Totman, Early Modern Japan, 370. 
120 Totman, Early Modern Japan, 370-371. 
121 Totman, Early Modern Japan, 371. 
60 
 
extinction of the “Japanese heart” estranged the Japanese people from traditional Shinto 
religion and the divine Japanese Emperor.122 Norinaga considered one of human beings’ 
most essential qualities a sense of wondrous inexplicability. He argued that “there are 
things in the world that are beyond the comprehension of ordinary men.”123 Though 
Confucianism from China had been praised in the Japanese intellectual society with high 
esteem, it failed to help Japanese understand their true hearts embedded in Japanese 
traditions. Norinaga’s way, most fundamentally, was the way of the gods, as he wrote: 
When we inquire into the nature of the way, we see that it is not the natural way 
of heaven and earth, nor is it the artificial, man-made way. The way is the way 
conferred by and received from Amaterasu Omikami, initiated by the ancestral 
deities Izanagi and Izanami, and according with the bright deity Takami 
Musubi.124 
Norinaga therefore dismissed Sorai’s man-made way in favor of the Japanese religious-
based social order, which supposedly originated in the ancient deities and was manifested 
by the Japanese Emperors as their secular representatives. Norinaga interconnected 
politics and religion, like Sorai had practiced. But he insisted that the deities responsible 
for the way were Japanese, rather than Chinese ancient sages.125 Norinaga criticized 
Sorai’s “way of the sages” for its obsession with governing the realm and pacifying the 
people and its lack of concern for individual existence and personal enjoyment, which 
were key components of a religious experience Norinaga endorsed. 
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Historian John Tucker noticed that Norinaga’s world consisted of merchants, 
priests, and urban residents, and his worldview was more influenced by the Shinto 
theology.126 Norinaga recognized the Emperor as the sovereign, and only acknowledged 
that Tokugawa Shogun assisted in imperial governance. This stood in contrast to Sorai, 
who saw the Shogun as the leader with ultimate political authority. Tucker thus 
concluded that at a significant level, Norinaga’s opposition to Sorai’s kobunjigaku and 
espousal of ancient Japanese studies can be construed as a reflection of Norinaga’s 
implicit opposition to samurai domination and his attempts at defining a more civil, 
aristocratic order.127 
Norinaga extended the unique virtue of the “Japanese heart” beyond Mabuchi’s 
interpretation, as Norinaga located a primal mover and identified the way of the gods. 
This primal mover was the god Takami Musubi, who created “all things and affairs in the 
world” with “his miraculous power.”128 Norinaga further argued that not only the primal 
mover contributed to the foundation of all early components of Japan, but Japan was 
favored by the gods and thus perfected to become superior to all other nations. Norinaga 
wrote: 
This grand imperial country is the home to the august and awesome divine 
ancestress, the great goddess Amaterasu, and this is the primary reason why our 
country is superior to all others. There is not a country in the world that does not 
enjoy the blessings of this goddess.129 
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Norinaga suggested that the silent but effectual will of the gods was determinative of “all 
acts, events, and other phenomena, good and band, ‘without exception’.”130 Therefore, 
historian Conrad Totman recognized in his analysis of Norinaga that, “like determinists 
everywhere, however, he left leeway for modest human intervention, and that leeway 
permitted his very tentative engagement in current affairs.”131 It is interesting to note that 
Norinaga, though addressing his ideology in a philosophical manner, was fundamentally 
advocating a political national superiority in response to Tokugawa Japan’s political and 
diplomatic circumstances. Norinaga, much like Yamaga Sokô, suggested a Chinese-style 
international hierarchy, but with Japan as the center. Norinaga was convinced that 
Japan’s divine privilege granted by the gods, while guaranteeing Japan’s prosperity, 
encouraged the spread of Japanese superiority to other nations. 
Norinaga aimed his teaching towards the general public, not only because of his 
lineage from a merchant household, but also due to his belief that learning would 
contribute to social well-being. This belief also encouraged Norinaga to prepare 
documents, like the simplified version of the Kojiki for the purpose of public 
instruction.132 He saw himself essentially as a reverent servant to the gods, shaping 
“current affairs” through public education, not by political decrees.133 Norinaga, though 
did not expand the realm of education to the base of farmers and workers, but broke the 
monopoly of political philosophy among politicians, bureaucrats, and scholars by 
expanding philosophical and theological education to commoners’ households that could 
afford literacy. Norinaga, though holding a notion of national identity, was comparatively 
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conservative in regard to the issue of political reform due to his ideological constraints.134 
Norinaga dissuaded any attempt to cancel or rectify anything which had been established 
and been difficult to change. As Totman suggested, “a strict determinist might argue that 
when one acts radically, one is simply being the vehicle of gods’ radical will.”135 
Norinaga, however, refused to unleash the will of the gods in the radical manner of 
political change through the restoration of the Japanese Emperor as both religious leader 
and political authority. 
Motoori Norinaga in his own lifetime was largely disengaged from Japanese 
politics, because he believed that political engagement was contrary to his philosophical 
idealism. Norinaga was content to counsel obedience and moderation through public 
education.136 But Norinaga’s intellectual legacy was significant. He offered an 
interpretation of Japanese identity that explicitly identified the gods as the source of 
Japans unique virtue. The long-lasting lineage of the Japanese emperors was the living 
embodiment of that divine inheritance. The Emperors and their court aristocrats held the 
responsibility to cherish the Japanese nation by ruling in the way of the gods, instead of 
the “way of the sages” incorporated from Chinese Confucianism, which corrupted 
Japan’s virtuousness. Japanese were obliged to behave obediently under the Emperors’ 
governance. Based upon predecessors like Mabuchi, Norinaga identified his vision of a 
“once-perfect and still-perfectable” realm as uniquely Japanese and juxtaposed this 
regime to denounce Confucian influence that seeped in from the Chinese continent.137 
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Norinaga’s argument was revolutionary for the development of Japanese proto-
nationalism and was provocative considering his pro-Emperor position; but Norinaga had 
not yet suggested to restore direct rule to the Japanese Emperors. Norinaga identified 
Japanese virtuousness as bound to the Japanese deities and their representatives on earth, 
Japan’s imperial lineage, and he warned that this ideal scenario was vulnerable to foreign 
ideological malignancy. Regarding Tokugawa Japan’s contemporary political 
environment, Norinaga explicitly specified that Tokugawa Shoguns were but trustees of 
that godly virtue. If there came a time when the alien malignancy manifested in the form 
of “foreigners making demands and backing them with military force,” Totman believed 
that Norinaga’s intellectual problem would become an immediate political issue.138 The 
burden of responding to that foreign threat, however, would rest on the Bakufu instead of 
intellectuals like Norinaga. And when that hypothetical circumstance did approach, the 
need for protecting the Japanese divine virtue and its imperial representative became 
vital. But it took another half of a century for the first case when Japanese nationalism 
would be facilitated by actual political or military incursions. 
 
Mitogaku 
The patriotic intellectual school of mitogaku emerged in the Mito domain and 
called for Japan’s future development according to a distinctive Japanese identity. Mito 
domain was a shinpan also gosanke domain in Tokugawa Japan, meaning the leaders of 
Mito domain shared a direct familial bond with the Tokugawa Shogun.139 Scholars and 
civil servants serving the Mito domain frequently had privileged opportunities to serve in 
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the central government in Edo and to facilitate the Tokugawa Bakufu’s administration 
and foreign policies.140 Historians have noticed the presence of Sorai’s ideas within forms 
of mitogaku in the mid-nineteenth century, and one late-Tokugawa scholar affiliated with 
mitogaku who saliently rearticulated Sorai’s political philosophy was Yokoi Shônan 
(1809-1869). 
Shônan began his intellectual career in mitogaku as an early advocator of notions 
such as reverence for the imperial throne and expulsion of foreigners, but he later rejected 
xenophobic rhetoric and articulated the opposite political doctrine, that of opening to the 
west. Shônan urged the opening of the country to strengthen the realm and guarantee 
national security. His notion resonated with Sorai’s argument a century before. Shônan 
shared a similar utilitarian perspective on political philosophy and advocated for ancient 
Chinese political initiatives. When criticizing popular and orthodox Neo-Confucianism in 
Japan, Shônan argued that the Neo-Confucian notion of “the investigation of things” 
should be understood in terms of “the utility of ideas” to the general public.141 Shônan 
appealed to the governing techniques of Chinese rulers Yao and Shun. And more 
interestingly, he also used George Washington’s legacy in American political history as a 
reference of political restoration.142 Shônan believed that if ancient Chinese sage kings 
and General Washington were alive in Japan during his contemporary period, they would 
adopt firearms and western technology against western intrusion to effectively defend the 
country. This was because the acquisition of western technology would bring political 
utility, which was endorsed by Sorai’s interpretation of Confucian political philosophy.143 
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Ultimately, Shônan advocated opening Japan to western contact, based on his 
understanding of a return to the political stability of ancient China. Shônan concluded: 
 In clarifying the Way of Yao and Shun and Confucius, we must exhaust the skills 
of western technology. Why stop with enriching the nation? Why stop with 
strengthening the army? Our task will be in spreading the great principles of the 
sages to the four seas.144 
Unfortunately, Shônan’s attempts to integrate themes from Sorai’s Confucian 
interpretation were not further elaborated. His emphasis of the benefits of the “way of the 
sages” and calls for opening the country and taking advantage of western learning were 
not further developed by mitogaku scholars. 
 John Tucker noticed that after Yokoi Shônan, Japanese intellectuals ceased 
utilizing Sorai’s intellectual works as references: 
 In the final decades of the Tokugawa, faithful advocates of Sorai’s kobunjigaku 
ideas, especially as expounded in the Bendo and Benmei, had all but 
vanished. …successful critiques from scholars associated with shingaku, the 
Kaitokudo, and kokugaku, not to mention those offered by more orthodox 
advocates of Neo-Confucianism, had ridiculed the obscure aspects of 
kobunjigaku, laying bare, in what were distinctively negative terms, the political, 
legalistic, and utilitarian tendencies in Sorai’s thinking. By Shônan’s time, 
Sorai’s influence, even if understood most generally, had all but completely 
disappeared.145 
Nevertheless, some traces of Sorai’s intellectual paradigm can be detected in the 
research and argumentation methodology of later mitogaku scholars, especially the 
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immensely influential work Shinron (“new theses”) by Aizawa Seishisai (1782-1843). 
But these traces were indeed muted through an implicit style of expression, because of 
the unwillingness to be explicitly associated with a paradigm of philosophy that 
otherwise had been widely targeted for criticism. When foreign military forces 
approached Tokugawa Japan, Aizawa Seishisai found such situations particularly 
threatening. In the 1790s Aizawa was impatiently concerned with Russians in the north 
and studied the situation strenuously. Aizawa recalled in his elderly years about his 
youthful sentiment at that time: 
 (In 1792) when I was at the tender age of eleven, the Russian barbarians arrived 
in northern Ezo. When Master Yukoku told me about their fearsome, cunning 
nature, my blood began to boil and I resolved then and there to drive them away. 
I build an eastern statue of (the Russian emissary) Laxman and derived great 
pleasure by lashing it with my riding whip. From then on I vowed to devote 
myself to learning (of foreign threats).146 
Aizawa completed a manuscript, Chishima ibun, in 1801 to inform his countrymen about 
the Russians and the lands north of Japan. He outlined an alleged legacy of ancient 
Japanese conquests that had long ago brought the Kurils Islands and continental northeast 
Asia under the rule of Japanese Emperor. Aizawa wrote: 
According to Honda Toshiaki, Kamchatka was formerly part of Ezo, and as such, 
should be under Matsumane control. But we have been ignorant of this for more 
than a hundred years since that territory was stolen from us.147 
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Aizawa, with references to information and misinformation from early Japanese 
explorers described how the Russians utilized cunning strategy to gain control of the 
territory. Aizawa noticed Russian success in constructing a great and prosperous empire 
by snatching land from ignorant countries like Japan, and he was alarmed by this trend 
practiced by westerners. 
 The 1825 Tokugawa Bakufu’s hardened restrictions against foreign vessels, and 
this move reinvigorated Aizawa’s concerns of the western threat. Aizawa seized this 
incident as an opportunity to prepare his narrative in Shinron. Shinron was Aizawa’s 
statement to encourage the Mito domain and the Bakufu to initiate a reform to revitalize 
Japan. Aizawa believed Tokugawa Japan’s society should cope with its prevailing 
problems, and he addressed his concern and reasoning in Shinron: 
 Our Divine Realm is where the sun emerges. It is the source of the primordial 
vital force sustaining all life and order. Our Emperors, decedents of the Sun 
Goddess, Amaterasu, have acceded to the Imperial Throne in each and every 
generation, a unique fact that will never change. Our Divine Realm rightly 
constitutes the head and shoulders of the world and controls all nations...But 
recently the loathsome western barbarians, unmindful of their base position as the 
lower extremities of the world, have been scurrying impudently across the Four 
Seas, trampling other nation under foot.148 
Subsequently Aizawa explained the special character of the Japanese nation, along with 
Japan’s godly origin, the vicissitudes of the imperial house, and how “great heroes” have 
emerged at critical moments to save the country in the essay’s main body. Aizawa urged 
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for a “great hero” at the time, in which Japan fell under the threat of the “western 
barbarians.”149 
 Aizawa pointed out Japan’s underlying issues and means of coping. Like scholars 
from the kokugaku school, Aizawa condemned foreign ideology that corrupted the 
Japanese society, but he also targeted obsolete domestic conceptions that hindered 
Japan’s development as well. Since ideological naivety prohibited Japanese from 
effectively coping with foreign threats. Aizawa believed the most significant issue was 
the urban samurai’s lack of martial training, so they were incapable of defending Japan in 
case of military conflict with foreigners.150 Aizawa attributed this issue to the Japanese 
economy characterized by luxury and inequality, and he believed that only by addressing 
these issues would a foundation be established for repelling the foreign threat.151 Aizawa 
then specifically explained the means: internal reforms to invigorate Japan, measures of 
coastal defense and military strengthening, and for long-term security, reviving the basic 
virtues of the imperial land through restoration of proper customs, proper understandings, 
and proper relationships.152 Aizawai concluded that what would be necessary would be: 
“Elucidating ‘what is essential to Japan’ (kokutai), being informed on world 
affairs, understanding fully the barbarians’ nature, strengthening national 
defense, and establishing a long-range policy—these represent the best form of 
loyalty and filial devotion, the best method of recompensing Imperial Ancestors 
and Heavenly Deities, and the best way for Bakufu and daimyo to rescue their 
people and dispense benevolent rule for eternity.”153 
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Aizawa referred to the Book of Changes to conclude: 
 “‘The Way does not implement itself; that requires the Man of Talent and 
Virtue.’ To solve difficult problems as these arise and to devise methods of 
dealing with changed situation—these task await the appearance of the Great 
Hero.”154 
The long intellectual history of Confucianism in Japan influenced Aizaiwa’s 
writings. It is noteworthy that some of Aizawa’s rhetoric were consistent with Confucian 
ideology and were congruent with Sorai’s interpretations. But, as has been mentioned in 
the previous section, Aizawa’s references to Sorai were implicit, in order to avoid being 
perceived as being connected to a frequently criticized school in the Tokugawa 
intellectual community. Aizawa raised the notions of an orderly and stable society and of 
loyalty and filial devotion, typical Confucian notions advanced in both China and Japan, 
though he did not explicitly indicate its Confucian origin. Aizawa also referred to the 
Book of Changes in the conclusion of his essay, and this text was one of the six 
Confucian classics endorsed by Ogyu Sorai’s kobunjigaku. Further as we have previously 
discussed, Sorai’s intellectual legacy, the research methodology of Sorai’s kobunjigaku, 
was apparent in Aizawa’s argumentation in both Chishima ibun and Shinron. While Sorai 
encouraged the close examination of ancient Chinese-Confucian classics for references to 
justify intellectual arguments, Aizawa returned to earlier Japanese documents for 
references to justify his mitogaku ideology of modernizing and strengthening Japan 
against foreign threats. 
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Confucianism in the Tokugawa Japan, as Kiri Paramore argued, was an 
integration of multi-disciplinary studies, and I would like to reiterate that Japanese 
Confucianism’s contribution to the creation and development of proto-nationalism in 
Japan was not always affirmative. Confucianism, while being the target of kokugaku 
criticism, contrapuntally facilitated the maturation of a sense of national affiliation and 
national superiority in Japan. Though no longer a popular intellectual school, or, to an 
extreme extent, driven to extinction, Confucianism and its Tokugawa-Japanese 
interpretation advanced by Ogyû Sorai influenced the scholarship of mitogaku. 
Confucianism’s philology in the Japanese bakumatsu period continued its function as a 
research methodology, though no longer popular as a system of political philosophy. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
 
 Japanese nationalism since the late-nineteenth century was particular because of 
its non-egalitarian character. It is possible that this derived in part from the intellectual 
foundations of Japanese proto-nationalism. And Japanese versions of Confucianism 
facilitated the development of those proto-nationalistic ideologies in pre-modern Japan. 
Tokugawa Japan’s Confucian intellectuals, like the Neo-Confucian Hayashi scholars, the 
classically-oriented Yamaga Sokô, and the more “fundamentalist” Ogyû Sorai, were 
aware of the Japanese state’s diplomatic and socio-political contexts. These Confucian 
scholars, with their active political consciousness, offered policy recommendations to 
benefit the state of Japan. Hayashi Gahô and Hôkô discriminatively viewed the 
neighboring state of Qing China as barbarian, and Yamaga Sokô advocated for an 
international system based on Japan’s socio-cultural superiority over other states. Ogyû 
Sorai politicized the paradigm of Confucianism to justify the consolidation of Tokugawa 
Japan’s feudal hierarchy. Modern Japanese nationalism inherited the Confucian non-
egalitarian domestic hierarchy and international superiority from pre-modern proto-
nationalism. 
 In terms of fostering proto-nationalistic sentiments, Confucianism served not only 
an affirmative function but also a contrapuntal target of attack. Kokugaku (“national 
learning school”) scholars, like Kamo no Mabuchi and Motoori Norinaga, discredited 
Confucianism as a contaminating foreign threat. Kamo no Mabuchi condemned Chinese 
Confucianism for inflicting political instability on Japan. Motoori Norinaga praised the 
nobility of Japanese culture in domestic literature and religion. Mabuchi and Norinaga 
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both noticed that Japan, among other states in the world, could prosper according to its 
unique “way” and collective identity, without China’s ideological influence. The 
kokugaku scholars endorsed an ideal Japanese state oriented around its socio-cultural 
values, such as the Shinto religion and classical literature composed in the Japanese 
language. Scholars of mitagaku (“Mito school”), the other faction of pre-modern 
Japanese proto-nationalism, criticized Confucianism as well. Mitogaku scholars, like 
Yokoi Shônan and Aizawa Seishisai, concentrated on Tokugawa Japan’s national 
security against emerging foreign threats. Shônan utilized Ogyû Sorai’s Confucian 
rhetoric to justify Japan’s political reform; using a notion of foreign ideology to discourse 
the defense against foreign intrusion, however, seemed illogical to other Japan-centric 
intellectuals. Confucianism, therefore, ceased its explicit appearance in the Tokugawa 
Japanese intellectual society. Aizawai Seishisai rejected Japanese Confucianism as a 
political philosophy for being obsolete in terms of administrative relevance and utility. 
Seishisai, nevertheless, consulted Confucian classics of religion and morality, like the 
Book of Changes, which is less politically sensitive in comparison to Confucian writings 
on political philosophy. He continued using the Confucian methodology of philological 
investigation to justify his argument regarding Tokugawa Japan’s national crises. 
Pre-modern Japan’s proto-nationalistic sentiments were institutionalized and 
mobilized by intellectuals and military leaders who participated in the pro-Emperor, anti-
Bakufu Meiji Restoration. Intellectuals and samurais from Southwest Japan insurrected 
against the Tokugawa Bakufu, for the central authority’s impotence to guarantee Japan’s 
national security from western intrusions. Sonnō jōi, meaning to “revere the Emperor, 
expel the barbarians”, was the slogan of this coup d’état. Participants acknowledged the 
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kokugaku notion of a Japanese state headed by the Emperor, who also held the supreme 
theological authority in the state religion of Shintoism. The incursion of western powers, 
who perceived by the late-Tokugawa Japanese intellectuals as “barbarians” in the 
Confucian rhetoric, threatened Japan’s political essence of kokutai discussed by Aizawa 
Seishisai from the mitogaku. The Tokugawa Bakufu surrendered its political authority to 
the supporters of the Emperor after the Boshin War (1868-1869 C.E.) between the 
belligerent sides, and the Meiji Emperor (1852-1912 C.E.) restored his direct governance 
of the Japanese state from the new capital of Tokyo.155 Japan after the Meiji Restoration 
continued using the Confucian notion of social hierarchy when distinguishing unequal 
social classes. The Meiji Emperor and his supporters issued the the Charter Oath of 1868 
as a strategy to consolidate his rule.156 One article in the Oath said, “all classes, high and 
low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the administration of affairs of state.”157 The 
Meiji Emperor and his government prioritized the goal of pacifying the public, which was 
one aspect of Ogyû Sorai’s pre-modern proto-nationalistic political ideology as well. The 
Meiji Constitution of 1889 codified the Emperor’s absolute political authority, 
emphasizing the Emperor’s political power as well as his authority in Shinto religious 
affairs.158 The Constitution resonated with kokugaku’s advocacy to revive Japan’s 
indigenous Shinto religion and establish social order and rites according to Japan’s socio-
cultural conventions. These effort at regime consolidation echoed pre-modern Confucian 
intellectuals’ similar political awareness of coherence between policies and country’s 
socio-cultural contexts. 
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Meiji-Japanese politicians, including Itō Hirobumi (1841-1909 C.E.), 
institutionalized proto-nationalistic recognition of the Japanese state into a systematic, 
western-style national identity. Itō and Meiji Japan’s national government demanded the 
modern Japanese’s socio-political obligations as to “advance public good and promote 
common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the law; should 
emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State.”159 Modern Japanese 
politicians elaborated the mitogaku concern for Japan’s national security into the slogan 
of fukoku kyōhei (“rich country, strong army”), which expressed the Meiji government’s 
goals.160 Military service became a civic responsibility of the modern Japanese through 
mandatory conscription. Expansion in armed forces served modern Japan’s territorial 
ambitions over Taiwan and Korea, where Japan established colonial rule from the late-
nineteenth century.161 Meiji-Japanese politicians employed the preexisting notion of 
kokugaku’s proto-nationalistic superiority over neighboring states to justify their 
conquest and colonization. They were acquainted with Confucianism’s conviction in the 
civilized-uncivilized (hua-yi) dichotomy as well. They, therefore, believed that Japan 
should share its reforming accomplishments with neighboring and less-civilized states, 
which had fell behind in the course of modernization. Military expansion inevitably 
caused casualties among the “Emperor’s army” to whom, according to the Shinto ritual 
conventions, the Japanese state erected the Yasukuni Shrine and officially honored their 
patriotic sacrifices.162 The Shinto sentiment proclaimed by the kokugaku scholars not 
only consolidated the Emperor’s authority, but also unified Japanese society. 
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 The Meiji-Japanese state further engineered nationalist to serve the country’s 
modernization and development. The modern Japanese government, though assembling 
western-like administrative agencies, asserted indigenous Shinto rhetoric and a 
Confucianism-derived state identity in its policies. In the Imperial Rescript on Education, 
Motoda Eifu, a Confucian scholar in the government and on behalf of the Meiji Emperor, 
decreed the sovereign’s expectation of citizens. The proclamation explicitly mentioned 
Confucian rhetoric, like filial piety and loyalty, but without identifying their Confucian, 
or even Chinese, intellectual origin.163 The Meiji-Japanese government officially 
sponsored local educational institutions and gratitude communities across the state, 
encouraging citizens’ literary education and moral cultivation.164 Once again, state 
sponsorship of education had been a long-standing custom in the Confucian political 
philosophy. The legal requirement of compulsory education reinforced Meiji Japan’s 
effort to emphasize nationalism. 
 
 Modern Japanese nationalism seems unique in comparison to western 
counterparts; and this is because of the history of Confucianism and Confucian-derived 
proto-nationalism in the Tokugawa era. This thesis aims to revise the historical 
interpretation of Japanese nationalism, which has neglected its indigenous features and its 
separate course of development prior to the entrance of western ideologies in the two 
millennia before the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that Japanese 
nationalism is or was an indigenous intellectual creation, because the national paradigm 
itself was nurtured by Confucianism, a foreign, but later indigenously crafted, intellectual 
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apparatus. The direction of intellectual influence was from Chinese Confucianism to 
Japan, prior to the nineteenth century; but then occurred in the contrary direction 
afterward, as notions derived from Japan’s Meiji Restoration and modernization inspired 
revolution and reform in modern Chinese history. The ideological exchange between 
China and Japan has been a persistent element of East Asian international relations and 
will remain important in the present and future. 
Finally, the shadow of Confucianism and Japanese proto-nationalism deriving 
from kokugaku and mitogaku still prevail in Japan today. The Japanese government 
promulgated the era name for the next Emperor on April 1st, 2019, while I was finalizing 
my draft of this thesis. Because Japan’s current Emperor Akihito has decided to abdicate 
for the Crown Prince Naruhito’s coronation, the Japanese government planned to 
announce the new era name, nengō, for the new Emperor at the beginning of April. The 
long-lasting tradition of picking an era name is to consult Confucian classics of the Book 
of Documents and Book of Changes and select Chinese characters from these texts. 
Emperor Akihito’s era name, Heisei, came from to Chinese classics: the Records of the 
Grand Historian and the Book of Documents. The incumbent Japanese Prime Minister, 
Shinzo Abe, who is perceived to incline towards nationalism, nevertheless, stated the 
government’s intention to consult Japanese classics for the new era name. The 
government announced the new era name as Reiwa, whose characters derived from the 
Man'yōshū (“Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves”), the oldest collection of classical 
Japanese poetry. Reiwa, it is claimed, is the first era name from Japanese intellectual 
origins. If Sorai, Norinaga, and Aizawa had the opportunity to witness this 
announcement, all of them would probably be surprised, but for different reasons. Sorai 
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would appreciate that Japan today still values Confucian philological methodology, 
through which the era name was selected. He would also feel happy that today’s Japanese 
continue the use of kanji, Chinese characters, in their daily lives. Norinaga would be glad 
as well, since Japanese society has recognized the value of Japanese domestic intellectual 
achievements in literature and history. Norinaga would also appreciate Japan’s desire to 
break intellectual dependence on Chinese culture. And Aizawa might be shocked by the 
fact that while twenty-first-century Japanese nationalists have discontinued the practice 
of consulting Chinese classics, they still implicitly continue the Confucian philology in 
searching for the Japanese state’s most sacred name.  
This thesis has examined Japanese Confucianism’s impact on forming proto-
nationalist notions in pre-modern Japan, with implications for the modern form of 
nationalism. The Confucian influence has not been erased. The controversy over the new 
era name’s intellectual origin continues while I prepare for the thesis’s defense; many 
Japanese have noticed that even what nationalist politicians and intellectuals proclaim as 
Japan’s own intellectual achievement had been written in Chinese characters. Present-day 
Japanese nationalists, though rejecting Confucian sources, still praise a somewhat foreign 
language to coronate the nation’s divine sovereign. 
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